

129

**BRIEFING BOOK
FOR THE VISIT OF
ANE/ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR CAROL ADELMAN
DECEMBER 1 - 8, 1989**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>I. GENERAL</u>	<u>Tab</u>
Afghan-Related Schedule	A
Islamic Do's and Don'ts	B
Useful Telephone Numbers	C
Map of Afghanistan and Peshawar	D
 <u>II. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION</u>	
Program Data Sheet	E
Afghan Program 1985 - 1990	F
Overall Program Description	G
Selected Project Briefing Papers	H
-Health Sector Support Project	
-Education Sector Support Project	
-Afghan Construction and Logistics Unit (ACLU)	
-Afghan Relief Flight Program	
FY 1989 Self Assessment	I
Estimated Percentage of Commodity Distribution to Parties by Project	J
 <u>III. TOPICS OF INTEREST AND MAJOR ISSUES</u>	
<u>Briefing Papers:</u>	
LNB: new) → Summary of Key Program Issues	K
P.L. 480 Program and Food Issues	L
LNB: new) → Insect Problem in Northwest	
Democratic-Pluralism Initiatives	M
Support to the AIG	N
Narcotics	O
Mine Clearing and Mine Detection	P
 <u>IV. MEETINGS WITH THE AFGHAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT (AIG)</u>	
<u>Talking Points:</u>	
Meeting with Acting President Gailani	Q
Meeting with Commander Abdul Haq (AIG Ministry of Interior, Chief of Security	R
Meeting with Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI)	S
Members of Afghan Interim Government	T
Organigram of Government	U

V. SITE VISITS

Briefing Papers:

Health Worker Training Program	W
Shindand Refugee Camp	X
OB/GYN Hospital (possible)	Y
ACLU Truck Farm	Z
The Asia Foundation	AA
Training and Vocational Center for Afghan Muslim Women	BB

VI. OTHER

Article by Congressman Charles Wilson "Continue U.S. Aid to Afghanistan"	CC
Articles by Olivier Roy: "Afghanistan: The Social Aspects of Recovery in a Fragmented Society"; "Islam in the Afghan Resistance"	DD
Pakistani Food	EE
O/AIDRep Staffing Pattern	FF

Schedule for Dr. Carol Adelman
Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Asia and Near East

As of: 11/16/89-AM

Pakistan Visit December 1 to December 8, 1989

<u>Date & Timing</u>	<u>Itinerary</u>	<u>Accompanied by</u>
<u>Friday, December 1</u>		
0610	Arrive Islamabad (via BA-119)	Met by JANorris and LCrandall
Morning	Free	N/A
1200-1330	Working luncheon with Ambassador, DCM Beth Jones, Counselor for Regional Affairs Harry Metherbee, Norris, Crandall, AID Deputy Guedet, O/AID/REP Deputy John Miller, NAU Director Limprecht, and Economic Counselor Larry Benedict (at Ambassador's Residence)	N/A
AFTERNOON	Free. Alternatively: (A) Visit Juma (Friday) Bazaar; or (B) Unscheduled discussions	Mrs. Norris/Mrs. Crandall, if Juma Bazar visit
1930	Dinner with Ministers, opinion makers, economic managers. (at Ambassador's Residence)	N/A
Accommodations	Ambassador's Residence (for entire party)	
<u>Saturday, December 2</u>		
0700-0745	Fly Islamabad-Peshawar by GOP "PUMA" helicopter	Miller/Crandall, Lino, and GOP counterparts (Ambassador Lyman to accompany for various site visits through return to Peshawar)
0745-0830	Drive to ANLF Mujahideen Camp (See TAB W)	

<u>Date & Timing</u>	<u>Itinerary</u>	<u>Accompanied by</u>
0830-0915	Visit health Worker Training Program at ANLF (Mojadidi) Mujahideen Camp (TABW)	Crandall/Miller, Lino, (Eighmy, Oldham and Mojadidi to meet at camp).
0915-0945	Drive to Peshawar Airport	
1000-1015	Fly from Peshawar to Landi Kotal by GOP helicopter	Miller/Crandall, Lino, and GOP counterparts
1030-1200	Travel by bus to Michni Point. Briefing by Khyber Rifles commander on Afghan border situation; return to Khyber Rifles HQ.	Miller/Crandall, Lino, and GOP counterparts
1200-1400	Return to Khyber Rifles HQ for regimental display and luncheon at Officer's Mess	Miller/Crandall, Lino, and GOP counterparts
1400-1530	Fly by GOP helicopter to Kohat; drive to Shindand Refugee camp near Kohat for visit and briefing. (UNHCR representatives to meet party at camp); return to Kohat (TAB X)	Crandall/Miller
1530-1545	Fly from Kohat to Peshawar	
1615-1700	Visit OB/GYN Hospital, Peshawar (TAB Y)	Swain, P. Oakley
1900	Working dinner with Afghan intellectuals and PYO and UN representatives at residence of Jerry Feierstein, Principal Officer (casual)	
Accommodations	Principal Officer's Residence	

Sunday, December 3

0800-0900	Discussion on food distribution issues at AID/Rep Annex (Tabs K, L)	GOP, Afghan, Contractor and AID/Rep Staff
0930-1000	Visit ACLU truck farm; view food convoy, departure (TAB H)	Mahan, McHale, Scott
1030-1200	Briefing by AID/Rep staff, contractors, grantees at AID/Rep Annex	

<u>Date & Timing</u>	<u>Itinerary</u>	<u>Accompanied by</u>
1230-1430	Working Luncheon hosted by AIG President Mojadidi, if in country; alternatively, hosted by P.M. Sayyaf (to be confirmed) (Tab A) T	Crandall/Miller Feierstein, Cushing
1500-1600	Visit to Training and Vocational Center for Afghan Muslim Women (Tab B)	P. Oakley, Tom Yates
1630-1800	Discussion on Anti-narcotics activities with Commander Abdul Haq (AIG Ministry of Interior) and Afghan experts	P. Oakley, Feierstein
1930	Cocktail/buffet hosted by Cushing (casual)	N/A
Accommodations	Principal Officer's Residence	
<u>Monday, December 4</u>		
0800-0830 630	Fly by GOP helicopter , Peshawar-Tarbela <i>Leave Peshawar for Tarbela via AID vehicle</i>	Peterson, Crandall/Miller P. Oakley, GOP counterparts
0830-0930	Briefing on NWF Area Development Project	Peterson, Crandall/Miller P. Oakley, GOP counterparts
0930-1200	Visit Project activities and meet with Deputy Commissioner Swabi, and Assistant Commissioner Topi	Peterson, Crandall/Miller, P. Oakley, GOP counterparts
1030 1200-1230	Fly by helicopter , Tarbela-Islamabad <i>Return by AID vehicle</i>	Peterson, Crandall/Miller , P. Oakley, GOP counterparts
1300-1430	Luncheon hosted by ISI (Tab S)	
1500-1600	Meet with all O/AID/REP and USAID staff at USAID building	
1630-1730	Wrap-up session with O/AID/REP USOH staff at Embassy Library	

<u>Date & Timing</u>	<u>Itinerary</u>	<u>Accompanied by</u>
1930	Cocktail/buffet at Norris residence (selected GOP officials directly involved with USAID/Pakistan's portfolio and USAID American, Pakistani, and Contractor staff)	N/A
Accommodations	Ambassador's Residence	
<u>Tuesday, December 5</u>		
815-1115	USAID 077-000	
0800-930	Meet with Ihsanul Haq Piracha, Minister of State for Finance	Norris
1045-1200	USAID Mission office. Presentations by Office Chiefs (in their individual offices)	Norris, Pielemeier
1230-1430	Luncheon hosted by GOP	Norris, Pielemeier & Others
1445-1545	Visit Asia Foundation (discussion on Foundation's Pakistan and Afghanistan related activities) (TAB AA)	Conly, Carter, Pielemeier Swain
1600-1800	Reception with Women leaders at HPN Chief Anne Aarnes residence	
2000	Cocktail/buffet at Crandall residence with UN representatives (Sadrudin to be invited, if in country), Ambassador Oakley, Ambassador Lyman, Mission Officers	
Accommodations	Ambassador's Residence	
<u>Wednesday, December 6</u>		
0730-0845	Breakfast at Guedet's residence with Norris, Crandall, Miller, Pielemeier	N/A
0900-1030	Visit Parliament House. Meet with Malik Meraj Khalid, Speaker of the National Assembly. Tour of the Parliament Building and USAID-supported activities	Norris, Pielemeier, Jones/Abington

<u>Date & Timing</u>	<u>Itinerary</u>	<u>Accompanied by</u>
1200 Noon	Depart Islamabad for Lahore (via PK-381)	Sprague, Pielemeier
1330	Luncheon with Mr. Razak Dawood, Member, Board of Governors, and others at the private (and USAID-supported) Lahore University of Management Sciences	Sprague, Pielemeier
1530	Meeting at USAID/Lahore Office with Pioneer and Cargill Seeds Representatives	Goldman, Pielemeier
1645-1745	Meeting with ConGen McKee and select local leaders	Goldman, Pielemeier
1830	Depart Lahore for Karachi (via (PK-313)	Pielemeier
2015	Arrive Karachi	Met by Guedet and Shippy
Accommodations	Shippy Residence	

Thursday, December 7

0800	Meet with Consul General Melrose, Senior Commercial Officer George Kachmar, and Shippy (Shippy residence)	Guedet, Conly, Pielemeier
0830	Breakfast meeting with US bankers (Shippy residence)	Guedet, Conly, Pielemeier and Kachmar
1000	Meeting with selected Private Sector representatives. Some potential invitees are Mr. Arshad Tanveer, Chairman, S.I.T.E. (Sindh Industrial and Trading Estate) Association of Industry; Khawaja Qutubuddin, President, Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry; and Tariq Sayed, President, Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry (Shippy Residence)	Guedet, Benedict/ Kachmar, Conly, Pielemeier
1130	Meet with Mr. Kamran Y. Mirza, President, American Business Council of Pakistan and the Council's Executive Committee	Guedet, Benedict/ Kachmar, Conly, Pielemeier

<u>Date & Timing</u>	<u>Itinerary</u>	<u>Accompanied by</u>
1230	Luncheon hosted by the American Business Council (Adelman to give luncheon address)	Guedet, Conly, Pielemeier, Benedict/Kachmar
1500	Call on Mr. H. W. Memon, Chairman, National Development Finance Corporation	Guedet, Johnston, Pielemeier, Kachmar
1630	Call on Dr. M. F. Sattar, Mayor, Karachi Municipal Corporation	Guedet and Shippy
1800	Briefing on Social Marketing of Contraceptives (SMC) Project activities, meet contractors and relevant GOP officials (Interflo Office)	Guedet and Aarnes
2000	Charity Dinner hosted by the ConGen with expected high-level Government and private sector attendance. (Sponsors: Rotary Club, of which ConGen Melrose is a member. Evening will include dinner/dance and PIA fashion show. After this "opening" in Karachi, fashion show goes to Western Europe and United States. Tickets with profits to charity: Rs.900.00 or about Dols 43.00; Dress: "informal", i.e., dark suit/dinner dress)	Guedet
Accommodations: Shippy residence		
<u>Friday, December 8</u>		
0900-1200	Meeting with Dr. Akhtar Hameed Khan, world renowned development specialist; visit to Orangi Pilot Project activities	Guedet and Pielemeier
Afternoon	Free	
<u>Saturday, December 9</u>		
0225	Depart for Washington (via PA-1067)	

ISLAMIC CUSTOMS

Do's and Don'ts for Women

- o Do not offer your hand in greeting/departing to any gentleman unless he offers his hand to you first. A more appropriate acknowledgement of greetings would be a simple nod of the head or, in the Afghan tradition, placing the right hand over the heart. The typical greeting is "Salam Aleikum" - Peace be with you. It is considered very rude to touch women, therefore, do not be surprised if few Afghans (other than the Westernized Amin-Arsalas') offer you their hand or stand up as you enter the room.
- o Muslim men will not expect a woman (Westernized or not) to stare or give long eye contact such as we would do in conversations. When speaking, avoid a direct response with eye contact -- speak as if you're speaking to everyone in the room. You will note they may not address you directly nor look at you while speaking -- do not be offended, the Afghans in particular will feel uncomfortable dealing with any (American) woman who asks probing questions.
- o Shoulders should be covered; avoid short sleeves, a neckline that is low, an outfit that is fitted (as opposed to unconstructed and loose). Wear the longest skirts you have, no slits. For convenience (especially when you visit the field and refugee camps), it's good to take along a large scarf that can be used to drape around neck, head and shoulders.
- o Avoid crossing legs, especially if more leg shows as a result. Do not point toe at Muslims or show the sole of your shoe. Both are considered rude.
- o Do not use your left hand!! If passing a document or simply a plate of food around the table, use the right hand. What you've heard about the use of the left hand for other purposes is true!

OFFICE OF THE A.I.D. REPRESENTATIVE

Revised 8/22/89

Embassy Switchboard: 826161(City Code: Islamabad 9251)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Office</u>	<u>IC</u>	<u>Home</u>
Harry Crandall	AID/Rep	2319/2320	11	822524
Pat Zanella	Secretary	2319/2320	2	820613
John Miller	Deputy AID/Rep	2319/2320	4	822883
Harriet Wilson	Secretary	2319/2320	3	822003
John Gunning	Sup. Prog. Ofc	2315/2316	19	822689
Curt Wolters	Prog. Ofc	2315/2316	17	822978
Claudia Wolf	Secretary	2315/2316	18	823150
Jack Huxtable	FFP Ofc	2307/2308		824691
Phyllis Oakley	Projects Mgr	2321/2322	6	821711/2 & 2506
Val Mahan	Proj. Ofc.	2321/2322	5	823412
Nipa Tenley	Secretary	2317/2318	9	820519
Thomas Eighmy	Proj. Ofc.	2317/2318	8	823360
Douglas Palmer	Health Ofc.	2317/2318	7	852503
Gary Lewis	Agr. Dev. Ofc	2317/2318	0	822931
Phillip Church	Agr. Dev. Ofc	2317/2318	13	823930
Aida Dickherber	Secretary	2317/2318	9	824115
Diana Swain	Proj. Dev. Ofc	2317/2318	15	822513
Missy Long	Secretary (PT)	2317/2318	9	820338
Pat Pearson	Office Manager	2317/2318	0	821931
<u>USAID Switchboard: 824071</u>				
Raymond DeBuce	Controller	370		822784
Mohammad Shakeel	Accountant	262		No phone
Mahmood Ahmed	Acc. (OEB)	262		" "
Auf Ali Khan	Voucher Ex.	204		" "
John May	Cont. Ofcr.	215/206		817161
Yaqoob Khan	Cont. Asst.	206		No phone

O/AID/REP - ANNEXG-6/4 St.74 Hse 2 - 824857, 815431 or AID Ext. 246, 365HomeProgram Div. (J. Gunning, Chief)

Ronald Bjorkland	Asst.Proj. Dev. Ofcr	821383
Vacant	Proj.Dev./Monit. Spec.	828997
M. D. Malik	Program Specialist	853488
Suhail Sadiq	Secretary	74216

Agriculture Div. (Gary Lewis, Chief)


Andrew Rude	Asst, Proj. Ofcr	821197
Ghulam Mohyuddin	Secretary	No phone

Commodities/Transp. Div. (Val Mahan, Chief)

Beverly Eighmy	Asst. Proj. Ofcr.	823360
Arnold Sobers	Asst. Project Ofcr	822839
Muhammad Yaqub	Secretary	No phone

Health Div. (Thomas Eighmy, Chief)

Jancy Waldhaus	Asst. Proj. Ofcr.	823542
Muhammad Yaqub	Secretary	No phone




AREAS OF AGRICULTURAL CONCENTRATION
&
LOCATION OF AREA DEVELOPMENT SCHEMES

Yellow areas = current scheme
Red area = future areas



Number of Schools and Clinics does not include those facilities run by PVOs who are funded by the O/AIDRep



• Hospitals
S = schools
C = clinics

ESHAHAR
UNIVERSITY

reshawar

SHAHEEN

KHYBER
PASS

NEW
PAKISTAN
CENTRE

MAHAR UNIVERSITY

KHYBER
HOSPITAL

EMERGENCY

RURAL
ACADEMY

UNIVERSITY ROAD

WARSAR CANAL

OLD JAMRUD RD

JAMRUD LANE

PARK RD

CHINAR RD

RAILWAY

RAILROAD

GATHER ROAD

25C Circular Road

CIRCULAR LANE

CHANDRA

DEHRA DUL

U.S. Government Afghanistan Programs
(\$ millions)

	FY 1985 ^{1/}	FY 1986	FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989	Planned FY 1990	85 - 9 TOTAL
BILATERAL	3.9	32.8	44.1	73.0	112.1	97.0	362.9
Cross-Border Program	3.9	18.9	29.9	45.0	68.0	70.0	235.7
Health Sector	—	(3.5)	(5.0)	(7.2)	(13.75)	(8.5)	(37.95)
Education Sector	—	(1.1)	(3.0)	(6.35)	(7.0)	(8.5)	(25.95)
Agriculture Sector	—	(0.6)	(1.5)	(4.5)	(14.7)	(19.5)	(40.8)
Commodity Export	—	(3.8)	(10.1)	(16.2)	(17.87)	(15.1)	(63.07)
PVO Co-Financing	(3.9)	(9.4)	(9.1)	(6.4)	(7.0)	(7.6)	(43.4)
Rural Sector Assistance	—	—	—	(3.0)	(7.0)	(6.1)	(16.1)
USIA Afghan Media*	—	—	(0.6)	—	—	—	(0.6)
Tech Services/Support	—	(0.5)	(0.6)	(1.35)	(.77)	(1.4)	(4.62)
Narcotics Awareness & Control	—	—	—	—	—	(3.3)	(3.3)
Emergency Assistance*	—	—	—	(4.0)	—	—	(4.0)
PL 480 Title II	—	10.9	4.7	18.0	34.1	17.03/	84.7
Commodity	—	(8.9)	(2.6)	(7.5)	(20.4)	—	(39.4)
Ocean Freight	—	(2.0)	(2.1)	(4.5)	(7.7)	—	(16.3)
Internal Transport	—	—	—	(6.0)	(6.0)	—	(12.0)
McCollum Program	—	3.0	9.5	10.0	10.0	10.0	42.5
Afghan Humanitarian Relief ^{4/}	—	(0.3)	(2.0)	(2.5)	(2.5)	(2.5)	(9.8)
Trans. & Other DOD Costs	—	(2.7)	(7.5)	(7.5)	(7.5)	(7.5)	(32.7)
MULTILATERAL	67.8	49.55	67.9	68.7	93.7	67.5	415.15
Refugee Programs in Pakistan	67.8	49.55	67.9	52.0	64.7	56.0	357.95
UNHCR	(22.0)	(18.97)	(21.6)	(16.0)	(20.0)	(19.0)	(117.57)
WFP	(40.2)	(25.28)	(37.5)	(33.0)	(39.2)	(35.0)	(210.18)
Volags and Other	(5.6)	(5.30)	(8.8)	(3.0)	(5.5)	(2.0)	(30.2)
Response to UN Appeal of 6/88	—	—	—	16.72/	—	—	16.7
WFP Cross-Border Food	—	—	—	—	14.5	—	14.5
Other UN	—	—	—	—	12.0	—	12.0
Mine Clearing	—	—	—	—	2.5	13.5	16.0
Coordinator's Trust Fund	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
GRAND TOTAL	71.7	82.35	112.0	141.7	205.8	164.5	778.50

- ^{1/} \$8 million was made available in FY 1985; \$4.088 million of which was carried over into FY 1986.
^{2/} 80,000 MT of wheat and 3,000 MT of non-fat dried milk was approved in FY 88 as an advance against the U.S. Government's FY 1989 pledge to the WFP food program for refugees in Pakistan.
^{3/} Would have to come from PL 480 reserve.

* Now completed

FY 90 AND 91 BUDGETS FOR AFGHANISTAN



The Joint House/Senate Conference Committee recently adopted the Administration's request for FY90 for Afghanistan (\$70 million for the cross-border program and 13.5 million for the UN Afghanistan Emergency Trust Fund). These are the budget numbers that appear in the recently signed Foreign Assistance Bill. The Senate had earlier adopted this version. In conference, the Senate was able to convince the House to adopt this figure (the House version had the UN funds coming from the \$70 million).*

Sequestration of funds under Gramm-Rudman and across-the-board cuts to finance new anti-narcotics initiatives may reduce these numbers slightly. As of 11/26, PPC estimated that approximately \$2 million (\$1.4 million under Gramm-Rudman sequestration and .5 million for narcotics) could be reduced from the \$70 million level.

* This figure does not include approximately \$10 million in McCollum Relief Humanitarian Assistance and \$17.5 in Title II food assistance. Total planned bilateral assistance to Afghanistan is approximately \$97.5 million in FY 90 and 91.

AFGHAN PROGRAM: 1985-90

BILATERAL/MULTILATERAL SUPPORT



U.S. GOVERNMENT AFGHANISTAN PROGRAMS 1985-90 (0 MILLIONS)

	FY 1985	FY 1986	FY 1987	FY 1988	FY 1989	FY 1990	TOTAL
BILATERAL	3.9	33.6	40.4	72.6	112.2	114.6	377.3
Cross-Border	3.9	18.9	29.9	45.0	68.0	70.0	235.7
PL 480 Title III	0.0	10.9	4.7	17.3	34.2	34.6	101.7
McCollum Program	0.0	3.8	5.8	10.3	10.0	10.0	39.9
MULTILATERAL	67.8	49.6	67.9	68.7	94.0	54.0	402.0
Refugee Programs \$	67.8	49.6	67.9	68.7	64.7	38.0	356.7
WFP I-Border	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	14.8	0.0	14.8
Other U.N.	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	14.3	16.0	30.3
TOTAL	71.7	83.2	108.3	141.3	206.2	168.6	779.3

\$ Would have to come from reserve

\$8 80,000 MT of wheat and 3,000 MT of dry milk
was advanced in FY 1988. This will be
corrected in FY 1990.

CROSS-BORDER HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

The Cross-Border Humanitarian Assistance Program (CBHA) was created by Congress in 1985 to provide humanitarian assistance to war-affected Afghanistan inside Afghanistan.

Responding to the devastation brought about by the Soviet occupation and nearly ten years of war, the program enjoys strong administration and bipartisan Congressional support as evidenced by its exponential growth. Funding has increased from an initial \$8 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 1985 to more than \$100 million in FY 1989. 1/The program is administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development's (A.I.D.) Office of the A.I.D. Representative for Afghanistan Affairs (AIDRep). The CBHA uses funding from four Congressional appropriations: (1) A.I.D. economic assistance funds -- both Development Assistance (DA) and Economic Support Funds (ESF); (2) P.L. 480 Title II agricultural commodities grants; (3) Department of Defense Afghan Humanitarian Relief excess non-lethal commodities and transportation funds; and (4) in FY 1989, State Department Emergency Refugee and Migration Account (ERMA) funds. The CBHA is a separate and distinct program from the U.S. Government's humanitarian assistance to refugees in Pakistan, which is the responsibility of the Department of State.

The war has taken a very high toll on Afghanistan's pre-war population of approximately fifteen million. There are now (with new refugees continuing to arrive from Jalalabad and Kabul) an estimated five million refugees relocated in Pakistan and Iran, an internal displacement of an additional two million, over one million killed, and countless of thousands injured, maimed, crippled, widowed, and orphaned as a result of fighting inside Afghanistan.

Afghanistan's agriculture, health, and education sectors, for which there was substantial bilateral and multi-lateral assistance from many sources before 1978, have been devastated over the past decade. Agricultural production has shrunk to a level estimated to be as low as fifty percent of the pre-war level. Declines are attributed to the neglect and destruction of irrigation systems and agricultural lands, the widespread loss of draft animals, labor shortages, and the lack of agricultural supplies such as fertilizer and quality seed.

Rural health care became almost nonexistent, both in terms of numbers of trained technicians and resources. Recent data indicated that Afghanistan has one of the highest infant mortality rates in the world at 183 per 1,000 live births. Moreover, life expectancy at birth is only 39 years, compared to 57 years in neighboring Iran and 54 years in Pakistan.

1/ Of the initial \$8 million, \$3.9 million was obligated. \$97 million in funds (including \$70 million for projects) will be provided in FY 1990.

The education system is yet another victim of the war.
Pre-war statistics indicate a maximum twelve percent literacy
rate for both men and women. This statistic has declined further because the vast majority of young people have received no education over the past ten years. Education which has occurred has been of marginal quality, conducted with limited human and material resources. Higher education barely exists. Kabul University's engineering and agriculture laboratories have been stripped and most of the trained faculty and staff have fled to the West or been killed.

These three sectors, plus relief assistance, are those upon which the CBHA has focused its efforts in liberated areas of Afghanistan and where the United States Government is far and away the lead donor. The Government of Pakistan has also contributed significantly to the program accomplishments through its cooperation, administration, and logistic support, plus provision of relief supplies.

The actual implementation of the CBHA program is conducted by U.S. contract organizations and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) in cooperation with Afghans. Working with the professional committees previously of the Afghan mujahideen's Seven-Party Alliance in Peshawar, Pakistan, and, more recently the Afghan Interim Government (A.I.G.), the CBHA has helped create and develop fledgling Afghan institutions for agriculture, health, and education as well as effective Afghan mechanisms for the delivery of food and other commodities. Strengthening indigenous Afghan capabilities is important for the long-term objective of establishing an independent and self-governing Afghanistan.

Much has been accomplished in the short life of the CBHA. Through FY 1989, over a quarter of a billion dollars will have been committed for delivery of agriculture, health, and primary education services as well as food and other essential commodities to targeted regions on Afghanistan. Major results as of November 1, 1989, are:

-- 1,500 basic health workers have been trained, 889 health facilities in 27 provinces have been established, and 500 tons of medical supplies have been shipped into Afghanistan. ✓

-- 1,209 schools are serving 120,000 students, 1684 primary school kits have been prepared as well as 1 million textbooks printed, 200 district directors have been trained, and 30,000 mujahideen have attended literacy classes. ✓

-- foodpacks for 83 million meals have been provided, about 168,000 metric tons of P.L. 480 wheat have been delivered, partly through 700 truckloads (using U.S. supplied trucks) in over 40 convoys. ✓

-- 549 irrigation schemes have been cleaned and repaired, nearly 200 tons of seed and 9,000 tons of fertilizer have been provided, and 400 kilometers of road have been built or repaired. ✓

-- over 800 wounded Afghans have been treated in the U.S. and 15 other countries through the Afghan Humanitarian Relief program, and 83 DOD and commercial flights have brought tons of non-lethal surplus DOD equipment and PVO-donated commodities.

-- over 8000 Afghans financed by A.I.D. are working to provide humanitarian assistance to their country. ✓

With the February 15, 1989 completion of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the formation of the Afghan Interim Government, the focus of the program has expanded beyond humanitarian assistance to providing selected support for the interim government (i.e., close non-political, collaboration with functioning and capable ministries such as Health Education, and Agriculture, and Finance) and preparing for the resettlement of millions of returning refugees and displaced persons. The U.S. is particularly interested in ensuring that conditions inside Afghanistan are secure and free from mines and that the existing and returning populations will be able to sustain themselves and begin the enormous task of rebuilding a nation.

This task is so great that no single donor nation alone can provide the resources required; the need for this extraordinary level of assistance and cooperation requires an international effort led by the United Nations as well as continued US assistance and other bilateral resources. Prince ✓
Sadrudin Aga Khan was named Coordinator for Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programs Relating to Afghanistan in May, 1988. Under his "Operation Salam" program, he has the task of coordinating Afghan programs of all UN agencies and donor countries, and is seeking contributions of commodities and cash through the UN. Initial UN efforts have focused on mine clearance training and awareness, assisted by army teams from the U.S. and other countries. In addition to the CBHA program, the USG is supporting this UN effort.

December, 1989

**AFGHANISTAN HEALTH SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT
(306-0203)**

Life of Project:	\$60.6 million
Obligated:	\$ 3.5 million FY 86
	\$ 5.0 million FY 87
	\$ 7.2 million FY 88
	\$13.75 million FY 89

Eight years of war have practically destroyed all previously existing health care facilities in Afghanistan, especially in rural areas. The Agency for International Development (A.I.D.), like many other international donors, has responded by designing a program to expand and strengthen health services inside Afghanistan. The two primary objectives of the Health Sector Support Project (HSSP) are: 1) to expand rapidly the availability of primary health care and first aid services inside rural Afghanistan; and 2) to strengthen the institutional capability of the Afghan Interim Government to plan, operate, and monitor expanded health services in Afghanistan.

Major health needs in rural Afghanistan are: 1) first aid and emergency care, including treatment for mine-related injuries; 2) mine awareness education; 3) maternal and child health services, including immunization, oral rehydration, prenatal care, child spacing, and growth monitoring; 4) simple curative services for conjunctivitis, anemia, acute respiratory illnesses and nutrition education and; 6) rehabilitation services for the handicapped.

The Health Sector Support Project (HSSP) is financed for a six-year period through a Cooperative Agreement with Management Sciences for Health, Inc. (MSH), a non-profit medical consulting firm that had extensive experience in assisting the royalist Afghan Government in developing rural health services prior to the war.

The original Cooperative Agreement between A.I.D. and MSH was authorized on August 8, 1986, at \$16.6 million over three years with \$11.5 million designated for direct program support and \$5.1 million designated for technical assistance costs. In November, 1988, AID/Washington amended the project, extending the it until December 31, 1992, and increasing the funding authorization by \$44 million to a new life of project total of \$60.6 million.

Originally, the HSSP worked with the Alliance Health Committee (AHC) and focused in training basic health workers (BHW), supplying BHW posts and clinics inside and providing first aid "buddy care" training to mujahideen. Since the

creation of the Afghan Interim Government (AIG), the Ministry of Health has absorbed the programs developed by the AHC. The AHC established six functioning departments: Administration and Finance, Medical Services, Logistics, Training, Preventive Medicine, and Monitoring. In addition, a Medical Sub-Committee oversees and advises all professional activities of the AHC.

The AHC set up five training camps for basic health workers (BHW) in the mujahideen camps surrounding Peshawar and also set up a training center to educate trainers, to provide refresher courses for medical personnel, and to develop curricula and training materials. During the first four years of the program, 1,254 BHWs have graduated from the three-month course and gone inside Afghanistan to set up health posts in all provinces. Fourteen thousand mujahideen freedom fighters have received training in elementary first aid treatment of wounds and have received emergency bandage kits.

At the present time, doctors, diploma nurses, and PVO trained medical technicians staff 110 clinics in 27 provinces. Additionally, 800 health posts and 8 hospitals have been opened. More than 408 tons of medical supplies have been procured, repackaged into kits for health posts and clinics (a complicated and labor intensive task) and shipped by caravan or convoy inside Afghanistan to resupply existing facilities or establish new ones.

The HSSP has developed a vertical immunization program with the technical and commodity assistance of MSH and the collaboration of UNICEF, which supplies the vaccines. Country plans will be or are being prepared for diarrheal disease, maternal and child health services, health and nutrition education, and a Health Information System (HIS) and a Management Information System (MIS).

The project places priority on Area Health Systems development and considers such development an important element of institutional development in Afghanistan. The HSSP has contributed to the development of an integrated health services system in the North in the area controlled by Commander Massoud and in the West and Southwest in the area controlled by Commander Ismail Khan. The HSSP also supports a referral hospital and a training center for BHWs in Takhar in the Northern Area. Further development of integrated Area Health Systems will continue during the remaining three years of the project in an attempt to establish a sustainable national health care institution.

EDUCATION SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT **306-0202**

Life of Project:	\$30.2 million
Obligated:	\$ 1.1 million FY 86
	\$ 3.0 million FY 87
	\$ 6.35 million FY 88
	\$ 7.0 million FY 89

The Education Sector Support Project (ESSP) was authorized on August 8, 1986 for a total of \$8.9 million. The life of the project funding was increased to \$30.2 million in December, 1988. The current Project Assistance Completion Date (PACD) is December 31, 1992.

The Education Sector Support Project (ESSP) objectives are:

- To create and maintain primary schools in the liberated areas of Afghanistan by providing teachers, supplies, student supplies, textbooks and teachers' salaries.
- To promote literacy among war-affected Afghan young adults by conducting literacy classes.
- To improve teachers' competency by conducting short-term training for primary teachers and literacy trainers.
- To provide an organization to plan and implement the educational activities which are sponsored.
- To provide opportunities for previously trained Afghan professionals to upgrade their skills in a specially designed university-level program.

The implementation agency for ESSP is the Education Council of Afghanistan (ECA), now incorporated into the Afghan Interim Government's Ministry of Education.

Project implementation began in October, 1986. By December 1986, the project had initiated literacy training for mujahideen in their winter camps, and by September, 1987 had sent supplies to 21,306 primary schools, grades 1-3, inside Afghanistan. By July of 1988 the project had added another 304 new schools for grades 1 - 4. Total schools now number 1,209. The 1,209 schools reach more than 120,000 primary school students throughout Afghanistan.

ESSP staffing includes four expatriates (two of whom are Afghan-Americans) and 20 local staff on the University of Nebraska at Omaha (UNO) technical assistance team, as well as a full time staff of 74 at ECA offices in Peshawar and Quetta.

The Education Council has been activated as the principal policy-making board for the ECA. The Council is composed of the directors and presidents of the Education Departments of six of the seven parties. It approves all major ECA undertakings. Assisted by UNO, the ECA has been primarily responsible for the accomplishments listed immediately below. The main center is in Peshawar with a regional office in Quetta.

The first large undertaking of the ECA was literacy training for adults, primarily mujahideen in their winter camps near Peshawar. Textbooks (in Dari and Pashto) were written and 529 literacy classes for about 8,000 students were conducted between January and April 1987, shortly after project mobilization. The literacy program was further improved in 1988 with the development of training manuals and materials and the training of some 600 teachers. To date a total of 30,000 adults have received literacy training.

Textbooks and instructional materials for grades 1 - 6 have been developed and published in both of the national languages of Afghanistan. Over one million copies of textbooks have been printed. These materials have the full approval and support of the parties. 800,000 have been distributed to both A.I.D.-supported and non-A.I.D.-supported schools. Textbooks for grades 7 - 9 are now being developed.

To supplement the textbooks, instructional aids have been developed and become quite popular. To date, 95,000 instructional kits have been distributed along with 48,000 large silk-screened charts and maps and 9,000 math and language boards. The ECA's instructional aids department also developed materials for the UN's mine awareness program. These materials are being distributed by the UN as well as by the ECA in its primary school network. The department is now developing sample narcotics awareness materials.

The training of 200 District Directors of Education is completed. These directors have reentered Afghanistan to supervise and train primary school staff in the districts of every province.

A fully documented database with data definitions, checking procedures, verification processes, and data analysis programs. The project supports 72 monitors who verify that schools are functioning.

In February, 1988, an initial 21 students started studies in the United States under the Afghan Scholarship Program (ASP). The program serves as a refresher and upgrades previously trained Afghan professionals who have been engaged in the war during the past several years, thus enabling them to contribute more effectively to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. A

second group of 21 students completed their studies in September, 1989. Under the Weber Scholarship Program, U.S. colleges and universities have offered financial assistance packages that will enable 73 Afghan students to complete already started undergraduate or graduate degrees. Additional offers from U.S. institutions could increase this number.

The project is currently comprised of the following major activities:

-Improvement of Rural Primary Schools - Support of the rural primary education program is being provided at a level of approximately 1,000 - 1,610 schools. The now amended project allows for expansion of the school curriculum into the 8th grade over three years, and the production of materials and texts for grades 7 - 9. The primary school component also supports some text revision and allows the ECA to distribute its texts to other schools in Afghanistan and in the refugee camps. District Directors inside Afghanistan will also continue to receive training and support.

-High School Textbook Revision Pilot Activity - Under this pilot activity high school textbooks currently being used in Pakistan and Afghanistan will undergo minor revisions and be distributed to fifteen high schools in Afghanistan on a pilot basis.

-Literacy Training - The project plans to continue the literacy program for the mujahideen in the winter camps near Peshawar and Quetta during 1989-90. In the following years, consideration will be given to an ECA proposal for basic adult literacy training inside Afghanistan that would take advantage of the existing ECA primary school system.

-Manpower Development - Provides participating Afghans with instruction in construction trades and office skills. Currently there are 70 trainees in 6-month courses.

0267W

Afghan Construction and Logistics Unit (ACLU)

Budget:	\$16.5 million
Approximate Breakdown:	\$ 5 million (TA contract)
	\$ 7 million (Operating Expenses)
	\$ 4.5 million (Commodities)

In November 1988, the O/AIDRep began to support the Afghan Construction and Logistics Unit (ACLU) in response to urgent needs to transport donated foodstuffs and other humanitarian commodities to distribution points inside Afghanistan, and to carry out basic construction and repairs on the war-damaged or neglected roads and bridges which carry these convoys.

The focus of the ACLU will gradually shift from transportation to road and bridge construction and repair as this is seen to have the highest rate of return to the widest range of beneficiaries.

The ACLU has been sending convoys inside Afghanistan since November 1988. Convoys are directed to a number of shuras representing all parties. No party receives undue favoritism. By the end of August, 1989, 156 convoys (ranging from ten to sixty trucks per convoy), or over 1,600 truckloads of commodities (over 8,800 tons), had been delivered inside Afghanistan. For the most part, these convoys have transported food in response to growing shortages. To a lesser degree some agricultural commodities have also been transported. When ACLU convoys have been organized, it has been typically for one or more parties or a particular council (shura). The majority of the food commodities have been transported to the area surrounding Kabul.

The ACLU has already transported a limited amount of wheat for the United Nations. It is expected that this service will increase, with the UN paying appropriate rates to the ACLU. (The ACLU has developed a rate structure that is based on a daily per truck charge added to a per kilometer charge. The structure is applied without regard to destination.)

The ACLU currently has a fleet of 88 new seven-ton, 4x4 heavy trucks, and 30 3/4-ton 4x4 pick-ups provided by A.I.D. The ACLU also has two operational heavy equipment teams which are engaged in road rehabilitation and bridge building activities. Each unit has a crew of 140 Afghans. This unit has over 66 pieces of construction equipment.

An A.I.D. contractor (Construction Control Service Corp.) is providing a three-person advisory team to the ACLU in the fields of transportation, management, maintenance, and business operations.

The ACLU has 546 employees (except for two Pakistanis, all Afghan) working in Afghanistan and Pakistan, roughly 5 percent of whom constitute administrative staff. A high percentage of these individuals belong to Hekmatyar's party, although the employees are all qualified technicians and administrators.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

AFGHAN CONSTRUCTION AND LOGISTICS UNIT

MANAGEMENT

- GENERAL SUPERINTENDENT
- ASSISTANT SUPERINTENDENT

HEADQUARTERS

*****\\

OPERATIONAL

//*****\\

ADMINISTRATION

- ADMIN. MGR.

=FINANCE
=PERSONNEL
=HQ STAFF

SUPPORT

- SUPT. MGR.

=WAREHOUSE
=PROCUREMENT
=CONST. SITE
SUPPORT
=MAINTENANCE

PLANNING

- PLAN. ENGR.

=SURVEY
=DRAFTING

CONSTRUCTION TEAM #1

- TEAM #1
SUPERVISOR

SKILLED
LABOR

UNSKILLED
LABOR

CONSTRUCTION TEAM #2

- TEAM #2
SUPERVISOR

SKILLED
LABOR

UNSKILLED
LABOR

TRANSPORT (TRUCKING) TEAM

- TRANSPORT
SUPERVISOR

DRIVERS

LABOR

NOT : DENOTES DEPARTMENT HEAD

Afghan Humanitarian Relief Project
("McCollum Program")

The Afghan Humanitarian Relief (AHR) Project reflects the strong bipartisan support in Congress for humanitarian aid to war-affected Afghans.

- o The DOD Authorization Act for FY86, Section 305, PL 99-145 initiated the use of DOD flights to transport DOD non-lethal excess property as well as other humanitarian goods, such as those funded by O/AIDRep projects or donated by Private Voluntary Organizations. The AHR Program was initiated in March, 1986.
- o The DOD Office of Humanitarian Assistance (OHA) has undertaken 83 Afghan Relief Flights (ARF), 10 Pack Animal Transport (PAT) flights and 3 sea-lifts to Pakistan. Beginning with the first flight in March, 1986, United States Air Force planes (42 C-5A and 41 C-141 cargo planes) have made approximately two flights per month from Andrews Air Force Base to Islamabad, Pakistan, where goods are off-loaded onto trucks for transportation into Afghanistan.
- o Excluding the transport of 1,140 mules, more than 2616 tons of relief goods have been delivered to date. Approximately 80% of the transported materials are clothing, 15% are medical, and 5% are vehicles and equipment. Altogether, almost two million items have been inventoried and transported.
- o Afghan relief flights (ARF) also transport war-wounded Afghans to hospitals in the U.S. and Europe for pro-bono medical care and return them to Pakistan after they have received treatment. In March, 1986, the first ARF delivered 15 patients to hospitals in the U.S. and England. To date, over 800 patients have received treatment.
- o The International Medical Corps (IMC) screens applicants who wish to participate in this program, selects those eligible, and collects their medical histories.
- o The Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM) receives these medical histories, decides who will receive treatment, and secures placement for them overseas.
- o To date, sixteen different countries have cooperated to provide treatment valued at over \$23 million. Typical treatment includes eye, plastic and reconstructive surgery, burn cases, and neurosurgery.

- o Current FY89 and planned FY90 levels for the program are \$13 million for each fiscal year, \$3 million of which is transferred to the Department of State (which in turn transfer to A.I.D.) for transportation costs in Pakistan, to purchase needed items, and to pay administrative expenses.
- o In May, 1989, a joint A.I.D./DOD evaluation completed a favorable assessment of the program ("Assessment of the Afghanistan Humanitarian Relief Project 306-0206"). The assessment found that:
 - the program "meets the intent of current legislation."
 - the program "complements the...Cross Border Humanitarian Assistance (CBHA) program."
 - "The Executive and Congress have developed a close working relationship" in this program.
 - The program allows the O/AIDRep to move high priority items quickly by using DOD flights on a non-cost basis.
 - Expanded use of sea-lift and reduced use of air-lift could provide a significant cost saving measure whenever timing is not a constraint.

0158W

P.L. 480 Program and Food Issues

The O/AIDRep has made considerable efforts and steady progress in the monitoring and allocation of food shipments inside Afghanistan. For example, the O/AIDRep has insisted and has gained agreement with the Afghan political parties to have monitors accompany all food shipments leaving Peshawar (see below re Quetta). The O/AIDRep also has informally reported significant progress in allocation-related discussions with the parties and the GOP. You will receive an update at Mission.

Deliveries from Quetta continue to be frozen due to refusal by two Afghan parties to allow monitoring. The delay in Quetta shipments could be made up in part by increasing offtakes out of Peshawar destined for the south and southwest (traditionally serviced by Quetta). Despite the problem in Quetta, food deliveries to areas traditionally serviced by Quetta can continue even in the winter (snow and mountain passes are not a problem), although distant destinations (e.g., Herat) may be blocked by fighting.

In early July, the DCC approved an increase from the previous 5,000 MTs offtake level to 9,000 MTs level (subsequently raised to 15,000 MTs for a two month period) with the understanding that the O/AIDRep would begin to pursue other means of distributing food, including the use of commercial channels. This DCC approval confirmed an earlier understanding that, of the 120,000 MTs of wheat provided for FY 89, not less than 10,000 MTs would be sold (monetized) for distribution within Afghanistan and, not less than 5,000 MTs would be provided to contractors and/or grantees to diversify channels for distribution.

Monthly Offtake Levels:

September - 3080 MT

October - 6458 MT

November The Mission reports that current November daily offtakes from Peshawar average 676 MTs per day. At this rate, the O/AIDRep expects to reach the authorized 15,000 MT by the end of November. You should inquire if the O/AIDRep plans to request an extension of their two month authorized period to maintain 15,000 MT per month.

The food shortage months in Afghanistan are March, April, and May (before winter wheat harvest). The food surplus months are June to September.


The provinces which A.I.D. and others can expect to reach from Pakistan include several areas (south, southwest and east) which would virtually never be closed by winter snows. These are Kandahar, Helmand, Zabul, Nangahar, and Laghman provinces, as well as parts of Konar and Southern Wardak provinces.

Alternative Delivery Mechanisms: The USG has encouraged the WFP and, AID/W has similarly encouraged the O/AIDRep, to seek "alternative" distribution mechanisms to those currently in place for the delivery of food inside Afghanistan. At present, P.L. 480 food deliveries are coordinated with the ISI and AIG with distribution primarily through party and/or ACLU trucks. The USG is seeking to expand delivery mechanisms to include, inter alia, PVOs and commercialization. The USG would like to introduce new or alternative delivery mechanisms in order to obtain a better understanding of the potential of private sector channels.

Links to Increased Offtake Levels: AID/Washington has been reluctant to approve increased offtake levels until new mechanisms have been introduced and tested for feasibility. There is concern that if food distribution remains solely in the hands of the ISI/parties/AIG, there will be a never ending increase in the demand for increased food levels -- demand that may not be market-oriented. Moreover, since party delivered wheat is primarily "given away", there is a current of thought that the war-affected Afghans will be reluctant to grow food (wheat) when it is provided basically free. Several individuals believe we may create a dependency which will be extremely difficult to break unless we introduce a private sector, market-oriented approach. However, our current approach does take into account a very important factor -- namely the low purchasing power of many of war-affected Afghans.

The O/AIDRep has now confirmed earlier reports by the Swedish Committee of a major infestation of locusts and sunnpest in several northwestern provinces of Afghanistan (bordering on Soviet Union and Iran). The infestations appear to have severely damaged food crops, leading the UN and the O/AIDRep to fear a major food shortage. The O/AIDRep is currently looking into alternatives to combat the plague including the procurement and use of acceptable insecticides. ANE/AF is working with the Mission to identify proper steps that need to be taken. You may wish to inquire as to the status of this issue.

PL480 FOR AFGHANISTAN AND REFUGEES 1980-1990




PL480 SUPPLIES FOR AFGHANISTAN (1980-90)

		FISCAL YEAR										
A. VALUE (\$ MILLION)		1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
BILATERAL												
COMMODITY								68.9	62.6	67.5	620.4	634.6
COST												
TRANSPORT								62.0	62.1	69.8	613.7	
TOTAL		60.0	60.0	60.0	60.0	60.0	60.0	610.9	64.7	617.3	634.2	634.6
WFP												
REFUGEE		631.0	639.3	670.6	637.3	642.2	629.0	638.7	624.2	632.7	639.2	619.0
CROSS												
BORDER											614.5	
TOTAL		631.0	639.3	670.6	637.3	642.2	629.0	638.7	624.2	632.7	653.7	619.0
TOTAL (\$ MILLION)		631.0	639.3	670.6	637.3	642.2	629.0	649.6	628.9	650.0	687.9	653.6
B. QUANTITY (MT)												
BILATERAL								37,900	23,000	60,000	120,000	120,000
REFUGEE		89,463	127,105	233,425	175,000	171,000	153,600	258,000	152,000	163,000	160,000	80,000
WFP CROSS												
BORDER											53,000	
TOTAL		89,463	127,105	233,425	175,000	171,000	153,600	295,900	175,000	223,000	333,000	200,000

81 The budget strategy for the 1990 CP was to leave the distribution between the cross-border and refugee programs unallocated. The 200,000 MT total is correct but the break down is an internal AID estimate.

CROSS BORDER FOOD OFFTAKE (1987-89)




BILATERAL FOOD PROGRAM: MONTHLY OFFTAKE

(MT)

YEAR	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JULY	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL	MONTHLY AVERAGE
1987		1,682	4,041	2,905	3,241	2,194	3,453	3,610	4,731	6,443	5,637	1,903	40,039	3,340
1988	2,523		3,340	3,160	2,860	5,674	7,093	12,313	6,230	7,740	7,639	4,420	63,730	5,311
1989	9,029	7,504	9,650	7,706	6,292	3,773	3,097	3,898	3,080	6,458			47,051	6,721

AFGHANISTAN FOOD SUPPLY 1989

Production 70%



Soviet 13%

WFP 0%

USAID 7%

Commercial 10%

OFFICE OF A.I.D. REPRESENTATIVE

ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE OF COMMODITY DISTRIBUTION TO THE PARTIES BY PROJECT

From January 1, 1988 to May 31, 1988

Party	: CEP ¹	: AHR ¹	: PL-480	: Health ²	: Education ³	: Agriculture ⁴
GAILANI	12	12	12	25	17	15
HAKMATYAR	18	18	16	--	16	19
KHALIS	13	13	16	--	--	10
MOHAMMADI	13	13	13	25	17	14
MUJADIDI	12	12	12	25	16	10
RABBANI	18	18	16	25	17	19
SAYYAF	14	14	15	--	17	13
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100

Distribution for the Commodity Export Program (CEP) and Afghan Humanitarian Relief (AHR) Projects is allocated under the three tier system agreed to in January 1988. First tier - Rabbani and Hikmatyar (32%); second tier - Khalis, Mohammadi and Sayyaf (36%); third tier - Gailani and Mujadidi (20%); reserve - (12%). For purposes of this report, distribution within each tier is assumed to be equal and the reserve to be equally distributed, not on a proportional basis, between the parties. In fact, there is not an operational reserve planned for the future as commodities are not being stockpiled but distributed upon receipt.

Distribution under the health project is carried out through regional commanders. The project is coordinated through the Afghan Health Committee. Originally, only four parties were represented on the committee (Gailani, Mohammadi, Mujadidi and Rabbani). Recently Khalis and Sayyaf have joined, although their parties have yet to take an active role or receive commodities under the project.

Distribution under the education project has been done in three tranches. The first two tranches were divided evenly between six parties (Khalis does not participate). The third tranche is being provided based upon the absorptive capacity of each party.

Distribution under the agriculture project is done in response to proposals received. All seven parties have submitted proposals and have received assistance. The percentages shown are (an approximate) estimates of distribution.

KEY PROGRAM ISSUES

Below is a brief summary of key issues that are likely to come up during your conversations with the O/AIDRep or in meetings with Afghan and/or Pakistani counterparts and questions that you may want to raise with Larry and his staff on these issues. Reference is made to relevant tabs where they are addressed in more length elsewhere in the briefing book.

Food Issues

The two key issues related to the food program are: (1) the technical capacity of the O/AIDRep (and that of other donors) in determining food needs in Afghanistan under present conditions; and (2) allocation and monitoring of food resources. The O/AIDRep has undertaken or is planning several initiatives to deal with the former issue, including undertaking an interagency satellite imagery program to better determine the agricultural situation and food needs. On the second issue, it has played hardball with our counterparts, making measured but steady progress, particularly during the last year. See Tab L for more information.

- o What progress has been made in the area of food allocation and monitoring? What are the next steps?

- o What can be done now to get full support for the FY 90 food program from AID/W?

Pest Infestations in Northern Afghanistan

The Mission has confirmed that a major pest infestation is causing serious problems in traditionally food-deficit northern Afghanistan. The O/AIDRep is trying to address the problem through the procurement of AID-approved pesticides. See next section for additional information.

- o What is the current status? How can assistance be provided to this remote area? Is additional food aid required?

Tab M provides additional information.

Relations with the AIG

The issue of how we might strengthen the AIG further through our humanitarian assistance program has been discussed at some length recently by AID/W, the O/AIDRep, and State. Key issues are:

- o Institution-building. Our current policy is to avoid an unsustainable institution-building program. However, how far will efforts to strengthen the AIG take us in this direction?

o Should we continue to perceive efforts to assist the AIG through our program as a means (to permit us to get more assistance inside Afghanistan) or as an end (to support USG objectives of strengthening the AIG)?

o How can we maintain a balanced approach and still satisfy the recent Legislative language on supporting the AIG?

See Tab N for additional information on our efforts to strengthen the AIG and specific language used in the Conference Report related to the AIG.

U.S. Policy Not Permitting American Officials or Contractors to Go Inside Afghanistan.

Language in the Senate Report of the Foreign Aid Bill Conference Committee states that "...AID should find ways to directly monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of cross-border relief programs inside Afghanistan."

o What are O/AIDRep thoughts on permitting AID officials and contractors to go inside Afghanistan?

Dog Mine Clearing Program

The Mission recently reported that the first demining effort using the Thai dogs was a huge success with over 1,000 mines uncovered and destroyed/defused in place during the 6 week pilot effort.

o Where do we go here with this program? How can the UN be brought on board given Saddrudin's concerns for the safety of the animals.

Additional information on demining efforts is provided in Tab P.

Pilot Refugee Return Program

The Mission has proposed assisting a possible UN refugee pilot repatriation effort. The program, which would be small scale in nature would be undertaken in Kunar and/or Paktika provinces--both of which are now under total resistance control. It would be done under AIG auspices.

o What specific assistance is the Mission planning to provide?

Insect Problem in the Northwest
("Locusts")

Information available to the O/AIDRep has confirmed extensive insect-related damage to spring 1989 grain crops in ten northern provinces of Afghanistan. This damage has led to serious food deficits in certain northern regions. The O/AIDRep has begun to work with the AIG Ministry of Agriculture on a contingency program to support UN and PVO efforts to deal with the food shortfall and pest problem.

- o This past summer's damage was caused by infestations of (Moroccan or Italian) locusts and the Asian sunn pest. The sunn pest is endemic to the region appearing every year.
- o Approximately 350,000 farm families have been affected in the ten provinces. Total deficit for these provinces comes to about 110,000 MT of wheat. (NB: Many of the provinces are traditionally wheat deficit so it is unclear exactly how much of the increased deficit is due to the pests.)
- o Using the Salam Express, the UN hopes to be able to deliver up to 18,000 MT of wheat during the winter months. However, an initial 1,400 MT destined for the affected area and transported through the Soviet Union is now stuck in warehouses along the Afghan-Soviet border owing to ill-will created between the resistance and the UN.
- o The O/AIDRep has indicated an interest in providing effective and acceptable pesticides and herbicides for a locust and sunn pest control spraying program to begin early next spring in the affected areas. In addition to providing the pesticides, the O/AIDRep proposes to train and equip approximately 100 Afghans in pest control measures and place them in the field as soon as possible. The AIG Ministry of Agriculture is enthusiastic about this program.
- o The Swedish Committee with UNDP help is already training a cadre of 50-60 control agents to direct farmers in the use of chemicals and equipment and to oversee spraying operations in 1990. Because of the impending winter, cropping cycle and insect life cycles, spraying will be most effective beginning early next spring when the spring planting is undertaken.
- o At the request of the O/AIDRep, ANE/AF in consultation with ANE/TR and ANE/PD/ENVR (Molly Kux), will draft a waiver requiring the A/AID's approval. The waiver will allow the O/AIDRep to procure insecticides without having completed an environmental assessment of Afghanistan.

DRAFT

AFGHANISTAN

A DRAFT STRATEGY FOR PLURALISM AND DEMOCRACY

**Office of the A.I.D. Representative
for Afghan Affairs**

November 1, 1989

I. Introduction

With communism stumbling in Eastern Europe; popularly elected governments taking hold in Pakistan, the Philippines, and elsewhere; and Francis Fukuyama declaring the end of history with a victory for democracy in the battle of world ideologies, it is difficult to accept that there might still exist a country in which democracy and pluralism are not at the forefront of national aspirations. But then, few people would argue that Afghanistan has ever kept pace with the march of history.

The origins of the modern state of Afghanistan are traced to the mid-eighteenth century when the Durrani dynasty was established by Ahmad Shah Abdali. Initially a tribal confederation held together by the common objective of pillaging neighboring areas, Afghanistan's development into a nation-state is largely attributable to the ability of its rulers to take advantage of the country's position as a buffer zone between the British and Russian empires. Without the generous subsidies provided by the British between 1880 and 1919 (the period between the second and third Afghan wars), it is unlikely that the state would have been able to impose its will upon the heterogeneous tribes or occupy its disparate territories. Even with this external support, the Kingdom of

Afghanistan was a decentralized state with little capacity to expand its authorities beyond the de minimus collection of revenues and the cursory enforcement of law and order in the larger towns and cities.

From the beginning, the government, not the people, has been the driving force behind change. King Amanullah, who ruled from 1919 to 1929, was forced to abdicate in favor of his oldest brother when his advocacy of unveiling women, educating nomads, and other reforms triggered a revolt. King Zahir Shah signed the 1964 Constitution that introduced a constitutional monarchy and provided for a supreme court as well as a bicameral parliament. The parliament consisted of a fully elective 216-member House of the People and a partially elective/partially appointed House of Elders. But few Afghans participated in the first elections under the new Constitution. In fact, great numbers of villages refused to accept secret ballots and polling booths. As Louis Dupree wrote:

The bulk of the ninety-five percent non-literate Afghans living in villages and nomadic camps knew little and cared less about the new Constitution and 'New Democracy.' Interest rose very high, on the other hand, among the intelligentsia in the major urban centers. 'The people won't wait,' they said, but what they really meant was that 'We (the intelligentsia out of power) won't wait... What these dissident intellectuals (usually western-trained) wanted was 'instant democracy':

take dry constitution, combine with fluid elections and stir, and voila, 'instant democracy'--without the agony of generations of development."

Olivier Roy, commenting on the same elections, points out that "Western democracy is meaningful only under certain circumstances: the identification of civil society with the state, and the evolution of a political entity which is something other than political theatre."

In Afghanistan, identification has traditionally been with the qawm (communal group), not the state. Local representatives in the 1965 and the subsequent 1969 elections came forward not because they had any political agenda per se but to obtain subsidies and privileges for their respective qawms. According to Roy:

"The atmosphere in parliament... was anarchic: a quorum was never reached, there was a constant din, and simple-minded and fanciful speeches were the order of the day...The state was viewed much as the court was in former times by the [representatives]: each came there to seek for favors. On the stage of political theatre, it was truly a comedy which was being played out."

The modern forms of politics that did emerge were confined to the urban areas and, within the urban areas, to small communities of students and professionals. The vast majority of Afghans remained bound to the tribal and ethnic traditions that governed their forefathers.

(In the nearly twelve years of political turmoil and fighting since the Saur Revolution in 1978, precious little has been contributed to the growth of democratic institutions in Afghanistan. Although some believe that a greater spirit of nationalism has been created, and that local councils (shuras) can contribute to effective, representative local government in the future, little else has occurred that might be associated with the development of democratic institutions. There has been no functioning national press, little contact with international non-governmental political organizations (such as Amnesty International or lawyers' and jurists' associations), no elections, and no public polling.

The sole attempt at gauging the will of the people has been the consultative shura that led to the formation of the Afghan Interim Government (AIG). Participation in the shura was limited to the seven parties of the resistance. Choice was limited to the seven party leaders. It is unlikely that the shura would have taken place without the pressure of the government of Pakistan, yet this outside assistance has been resented by many Afghans and its 'made in Pakistan' label remains a liability to the AIG.

The current struggle in Afghanistan is not a struggle for democracy, but for self-determination. It is a rejection of foreign interference, a repudiation of Godless communism, and resistance to the further penetration of the countryside by state bureaucracy. It has been waged under the banner of Islam.

It is debatable whether the struggle can even be characterized as revolutionary. Aside from fierce disagreement over the role of the king, there is little agitation that the basic structure of government should be changed. (In fact, it is striking how little attention is given to adjusting that structure to meet the changing realities of Afghanistan after ten years of war and in the face of current international trends.) There is consensus among the resistance leaders that power should be transferred to them so that they can take over the established infrastructure of the existing government. There is complete agreement that any new government must be Islamic; although little definition about what an Islamic government means.

It is unfortunate that even the fall of the Kabul regime will not necessarily resolve the political future of the country. Although the resistance political structure has progressed from 80 odd parties to seven dominant parties, to an alliance to the present interim government, the AIG is in the nascent stages of development. Lacking the benefit of

(human and capital resources, it has a weak executive branch and no organized judicial or legislative branches. It has avoided or been unable to reconcile the differences between the Islamist and traditionalist factions of the resistance, found it difficult to subjugate personal ambitions to the achievement of common objectives, and demonstrated only limited success in reaching beyond the seven parties from which it was organized (although serious efforts are being made to involve the eight Shia parties based in Iran). No one can predict its durability and most close observers stress the word "interim" in discussing it, anticipating many permutations before a truly "national" government is installed in Kabul.

It is within this context of political uncertainty, the absence of an effective government counterpart, limited and unsuccessful experience with democracy, and historical aversion to outside interference that the Office of A.I.D. Representative offers its strategy to promote democracy and pluralism in Afghanistan.

II. The Strategy

The Geneva Accords call for the withdrawal of the Soviet forces; self-determination of the Afghan people; restoration of Afghanistan's neutral, non-aligned status; and the return of the refugees with safety

and honor. Only the first of these objectives has been achieved. It is now up to the Afghans, with the assistance of friendly nations, to accomplish the remaining three.

Much of the U.S. assistance will be provided by A.I.D., whose new congressional mandate emphasizes economic growth, resource-sustainable development, poverty alleviation, and pluralism. Discussing pluralism, the House of Representatives Report on the International Cooperation Act of 1989,

"recognizes the fundamental relationship which exists between economic development and political development. The objective is premised on the view that societies in which power and authority are widely diffused and legitimately exercised, in which government is democratically elected and responsive to the will of the people, and in which internationally recognized human rights are respected, are better able to achieve sustainable and responsible development."

While the Mission's approved resettlement and rehabilitation strategy limits development objectives of the program in favor of relief, exceptions should be made for development-related activities that are judged essential to nation building. Democracy and pluralism activities fit easily into this category. At this same time, the cause of democracy and pluralism could be set back if the political and cultural

acceptability of activities is misjudged, or implementation mishandled. Consequently, the mission will approach such initiatives with a mix of commitment and caution. Several principles will guide our resource allocations:

--The most effective means of promoting democracy and pluralism is through carefully targetted, low profile assistance. U.S. foreign policy has consistently emphasized self-determination for the Afghan people and consciously avoided demonstrating political preference for any one party, party philosophy, or party leader. This policy acknowledges that outsiders have been historically unsuccessful at imposing their will on Afghanistan and that strong association with an external sponsor can damage the future of ideas, organizations and, often, individuals. The Mission's posture on elections is illustrative of how it will follow this principle. We will welcome the opportunity to provide assistance in organizing elections, but believe the impetus must come from the Afghans. In discussions with the AIG, we voice our support for elections and indicate that assistance is available. However, we recognize that both the timing and the process must be Afghan and that public U.S.G. association should be limited to words of support for the effort.

(--During this stage in Afghanistan's history, pluralism must not be promoted at the expense of political unity. If an essential characteristic of democratic pluralism is the existence of widely diffused power centers, then Afghanistan is a model of the ideal. Power is localized in the hands of commanders, religious leaders, and tribal elders, many of whom are working increasingly with shuras. Decentralization, a strength in forcing the Soviet withdrawal and a source of frustration in forging national unity, is an Afghan tradition.

Until the take over of the communist regime, 20th century Afghan central governments were never strong enough to be repressive. This trend is expected to continue after the fall of the Kabul regime. It is in fact likely that, as a result of the war, Afghanistan will become an even more pluralistic society. Non-Pushtun ethnic groups--such as the Hazaras, but especially the Tajiks--that were dominated before the war, now sense that they have earned a stake in the national balance of power.

What is needed are mechanisms for effectively integrating these groups into the existing power structure and for facilitating peaceful conflict resolution in this already pluralistic society. Support to professional organizations and public advocacy groups, while desirable, must be handled carefully. Thoughtful Afghans with whom we have discussed

pluralism, point out that strengthening these groups, without conscious forethought to downstream effects, could further splinter an already fragmented political scene.

--Proposals will be reviewed to ensure that they demonstrate a heightened sensitivity to historical experience and socio-political factors. Given the complex nature of Afghan society, which has been magnified by more than a decade of war, it will be very easy to mistakenly support a group that is politically unacceptable and, therefore, ineffective; or worse, divisive. It will be equally easy to make cultural miscalculations. Programs which are concerned with empowering women, for example, always carry the potential for backlash. Trouble comes both from those who sincerely believe women's role in society should be limited and from those who manipulate the issue to achieve other objectives. The International Rescue Committee's Women's Social Service Center has handled this problem well. Understanding the environment, it has let Afghan women take the lead in developing the Center, emphasized the Center's Islamic credentials (e.g., by promoting literacy training through study of the Koran), and solicited the active support of party leaders' wives.

--Mission-financed activities will avoid the further estrangement of the urban elite from the rural masses. Ideally, all organizations that we support will have some outreach capacity to steep their ideas, agendas, and programs in the reality of the Afghan mainstream. For example, a lawyers' association, in addition to proposing legal codes and constitutions, might want to also provide pro bono legal aid in order to better understand how laws can be made relevant and fair to the more typically educated/employed Afghan.

--To the extent possible, the mission will build on existing Afghan traditions in the pursuit of democracy and pluralism objectives. The example which comes most quickly to mind is the shura.* Historically, these local councils consisted of a fluid membership and were called into being only when a specific village need arose (e.g., resolution of personal conflict, the repair of a mosque). Increasingly, however, shuras are being organized to give affected populations a voice in the planning and distribution of outside assistance, as well as to resolve more traditional issues. As a result, regularly meeting shuras are becoming more wide-spread.

* An extension of the shura is the Loya Jurga (general assembly) which has traditionally been called to confirm kings, legitimize constitutions, and to otherwise participate in the decisions of national leadership.

While decision-making members of the shura are selected and not elected, and are not always fully representative of the community at large, they do tend to be individuals whom the community respects as fair, influential, and invested with strong negotiating skills. Interested members of the community are generally welcome to attend and often offer their opinions at shura meetings. While commanders can exert disproportionate influence over shuras, the public nature of the decision-making process does provide a degree of countervailing balance.

The shuras' means of reaching decisions are not the "one man, one vote" democratic ideal. Nevertheless, the objective is a consensus which the majority can agree to. Reaching consensus may not be as difficult as one might believe, particularly in Pushtun areas where a strong body of tribal law has existed. In fact, it has not been uncommon for a non-Pushtun group to request local Pushtun elders to resolve a non-Pushtun conflict.

Despite the advantages of shuras, there remains disagreement as to whether they can evolve into an effective arm of local, representative government. A recent ACBAR report summarizes both points of view:

"There appears to be a fairly broad belief that Afghans have experience with institutions of this kind. Such experience,

of course, could help ensure the success and smooth operation...Some commentators also appear to believe that because of what they see as the egalitarian nature of Afghan culture, councils can be forced to function democratically and may even be used to strengthen democratic processes. On the other end of the spectrum there are those who believe that it will be very difficult to establish councils that reflect anything other than the power of commanders, that such councils will be very limited in the kinds of tasks they can undertake, and that they must be closely supervised because they cannot be expected to be fair, given socio-cultural pressures to benefit their own kin and lineage."

III. The Program

Within the context of the five guiding principles, the mission has identified a number of democratic values which it is promoting or will explore promoting in the future:

--Democratic Process

As mentioned above, shuras, while not strictly conforming to the Western model of democratic process, represent an Afghan institution that has the potential for giving affected populations a voice in the administration of justice, the distribution of resources and responsibilities, and other functions normally performed by governments. Thus, to the extent the mission encourages and strengthens shuras, it promotes ^{the} democratic process.

(Through the Agriculture Sector Support Project (ASSP), the Mission is working with 16 project-specific shuras which are gaining experience in identifying local priorities, planning programs, and allocating resources. We will continue to strengthen the capabilities of these shuras and, within the authorized scope of the project, begin to work with new shuras. The mission is also supporting a number of PVO-assisted shuras through the Rural Assistance Project and is likely to establish or identify existing shuras to work with under the Narcotics Awareness and Control Project.

Under an anticipated democracy and pluralism dimension of the PVO CO-Financing Project, the study of shuras will be eligible for support. Areas of particular interest might include possible linkages between shuras and any resistance-led regional or national governments; the nature of community participation in and satisfaction with shura decisions; optimal areas for shura responsibility; analysis of whether donor embracement of shuras has changed the way they are perceived among Afghans; and, the potential for broadening the capabilities of the ASSP and other function-specific shuras. Also eligible for support will be programs designed to strengthen shuras, e.g., public administration programs which train shura nominees in bookkeeping and other administrative tasks.

To further promote the democratic process, the mission will make funds available (through the PVO Co-Financing or the Technical Services and Support Projects) for studies and activities relating to planning Afghan elections. However, given Afghan disagreements over the form and timing of elections--and, thus, the divisiveness of the issue--and the perception that outside interference will taint the process, support for elections will be on a low-profile basis on cue from the AIG, or its successor.

--Free Flow of Information

The greatest single factor inhibiting the free flow of information in the resistance controlled areas of Afghanistan is the low rate of literacy. To improve this situation, the mission has supported a literacy program through its Education Sector Support Project. As of September 30, 1989, 30,000 Mujahideen had attended the four month course after which 80 percent demonstrated the ability to read at near the third grade level. The mission will explore the possibility of extending this course to women.

To further promote the free flow of information and the exchange of ideas, the Mission intends to make funds available under a new democracy

(and pluralism dimension of the PVO Co-Financing Project, especially for Afghan workshops, conferences, and seminars on relevant topics, and specific activities proposed by Afghan professional associations and public advocacy groups.* Selection criteria~~X~~ will be developed during an upcoming redesign of the project.

--Human Rights

Human rights constitute the most basic of democratic values. Governments have an obligation to protect and expand the range of choices individuals may make regarding economic, political, and social preference. In direct opposition to that obligation, the regime maintains the 25,000 person strong Ministry of State Security, the dreaded WAD. Its principal objective is to control and manipulate the choices of the Afghan people. Its principal tools are surveillance, interrogation, imprisonment, torture, and execution.

* Most, if not all of these will be exile groups based in Peshawar. Financing them, as well as several groups mentioned subsequently, could put the Mission at odds with its cross-border mandate. We suggest the appropriateness of supporting groups in Pakistan be confirmed by Washington for the record.

The mission is exploring mechanisms by which it can help publicize the human rights record of the regime and thus bring to bear international pressure that might halt, or at least curtail, the pain and suffering caused by the on-going violations. In FY 89, a small grant was awarded to the Afghan Psychiatric Center which treats victims of torture and is in contact with Amnesty International. Additional funds may be provided to the Center as well as to other organizations judged capable of contributing to an improved human rights environment.

The Mission would like to identify a new or existing organization which it could assist in developing the capability to: encourage the observance and defense of human rights for all Afghans, with an emphasis on respect for Islamic and international norms; monitor human rights practices of both the regime and the resistance; and assist the AIG in its efforts to ensure resistance compliance to human rights principles.

--Inclusion of the Disenfranchised

Certain groups in Afghan society have not been accorded access to the same opportunities that have been available to the dominant group of the society, the Pushtun male. Women and non-Sunnis have been particularly neglected. To promote a truly pluralistic society, in which all groups have equal opportunity, could be the most difficult objective of the

Mission's democracy and pluralism strategy, but some steps have already been taken. The Education and Health Sector Support Projects have both targetted programs for females and Shias which are described in the Mission's FY 89 Program Review (Islamabad 22931 and 22941). Both of these projects are coordinated with Ministries of the AIG, and serve to raise the conciousness of Afghanistan's future leaders with regard to the country's responsibility to special, under-served groups as well as give them experience developing and implementing programs for such groups.

Under the PVO Co-Financing Project, the mission has supported the Afghan Obstetric and Gynecological Hospital in order to further extend health care available to women and the Afghan Psychiatric Center, thirty percent of whose caseload is women. Under the Rural Assistance Project, the mission has enabled Save the Children to initiate a women's income generating project inside Afghanistan.

The Mission intends to continue to push for greater inclusion of minority groups as beneficiaries of its projects. In addition, it will seek to fund additional activities for women through its PVO portfolio. One possible candidate is the IRC's Afghan-run Women's Social Services

(Center, which intends to provide literacy training and other outreach support to illiterate Afghan women. Another near-term possibility is the expansion of Save the Children's in-Afghanistan income-generating activity.

--Economic Opportunity

Open market economies are a demonstrated threat to repressive closed political systems. Likewise, economic opportunity and the creation of a strong middle class strengthen the ability of societies to resist the imposition of unpopular forms of government. To date, the Mission's program has focussed on relief and basic human needs, but in FY 89 it began to direct attention toward restoring the Afghan economy and increasing economic opportunity.

The Education Sector Support Project recently initiated a training program for construction trades and office skills, the graduates of which will be highly employable. The Agriculture Sector Support Project is re-establishing orchards with cooperative farmers, and under its Private Sector Agribusiness component, will help Afghans establish themselves in privately-led agricultural export markets. A variety of private sector sales mechanisms are being examined for the distribution of fertilizer,

seed, and PL 480 wheat. The Mission may, at some later point, begin to experiment with private sector credit, which could further facilitate the creation of a strong middle class.

--World View

A hallmark of open societies is the participation of its citizens in international meetings and organizations. Third World participants in international fora are able to return to their countries with new ideas and a sense of the political, economic, scientific, and other trends in the global village. Afghanistan's opinion makers have been afforded little opportunity to keep pace with the mainstream of current affairs over the past decade. Re-integration into international networks will influence the future direction of the country's society. To promote linkages between Afghanistan and the rest of the world, the Mission will rely on its existing projects to finance Afghan participation in international fora (it has already sponsored Afghan participation in International Narcotics and Oral Rehydration conferences). It will also encourage international organizations to sponsor the start-up of branch organizations in resistance controlled regions of Afghanistan.

V. Conclusion

Afghanistan's economy has been devastated and its society traumatized by more than ten years of military violence, socio-economic turmoil, and political uncertainty. While many Afghans may try to cling to the anchors of the past, it will be difficult to return to the old ways. Too much has changed. It is unknown whether tribal, religious, or secular law will emerge as prevalent; whether traditional or resistance authorities will be looked to for leadership; or whether a generation of Afghans who have grown up in refugee camps and cities will be able to adapt to the rural way of life. In some ways, transitional periods, such as the one Afghanistan is now faced with, are ideal times to promote positive change and adjustment. On the other hand, improperly handled, both the concepts being promoted and the object of the promotion (in this instance, Afghanistan) can be severely damaged. We are, thus, called upon to approach democracy and pluralism initiatives with careful forethought, cautious implementation, and a conscientious commitment to Afghan self-determination.

SUPPORT TO THE AFGHAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT (AIG)

The ANE Bureau, the O/AIDRep, and State have been considering the issue of how we might strengthen the AIG further through the Cross-Border Humanitarian Assistance (CBHA) program, within our current policy and legislative framework, i.e., providing concrete but measured support while avoiding the pitfalls of an unsustainable institution-building effort.

The O/AIDRep coordinates assistance with the Ministries of Health, Education and Agriculture and has provided some limited logistical support to these same entities as well as the Ministries of Finance and Information.

Our policy has been, and will continue to be in the near-term, not to provide funds directly to the AIG, but rather to make procurements ourselves and transfer supplies for their operations (e.g., office materials) to them. Where salaries are involved, all individuals whose salaries we support, go under the payroll of our contractors. The contractors disburse funds directly to the individuals.

In addition to continuing the type of assistance we have provided so far, DAA/ANE, ANE/AF and STATE, have discussed with Larry Crandall ways that we can bring the AIG more fully on board project planning efforts. One idea is to have the AIG sign Memorandum of Understanding with A.I.D. accompanying our contracts/agreements in order to give the AIG a greater sense of responsibility/commitment to CBHA projects but without getting them involve in the management of funds. You should ask Larry what is the status of this idea.

Recent Congressional language (see next page) strongly encourages A.I.D. to strengthen the AIG, particularly their financial management capabilities. We should continue to resist channeling funds through the AIG given their limited capabilities; we are working closely with the Hill, however, to ensure that their concerns are met.

The above points were discussed with Larry and Tom Reese during Larry's recent TDY. ANE and Larry both agree on continuing the kind of measured assistance that we have provided to date. Yet, given the sensitive issues involved in our assistance to the AIG, the O/AIDRep requests specific approval from ANE to undertake even limited assistance efforts to the AIG. You may wish to discuss with Larry his views on assistance to the AIG and, if you are in agreement with them, be prepared to delegate to the O/AIDRep authority to provide limited assistance to the AIG without clearing each request with AID/W--assuming such grants are consistent with currentt policy. The details and formal authority for this could be spelled out in a cable from Washington to the field when you return.

MAKING APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 1990, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

NOVEMBER 11, 1989.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. ORSKY, from the committee on conference,
submitted the following

CONFERENCE REPORT

[To accompany H.R. 2939]

The Committee of Conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 2939) "making appropriations for the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1990, and for other purposes," having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows:

That the Senate recede from its amendments numbered 5, 9, 14, 28, 29, 34, 39, 41, 50, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 70, 71, 73, 80, 82, 88, 93, 99, 100, 101, 104, 106, 108, 109, 114, 119, 129, 180, 175, 176, 199, 242, 280, 282, 285, and 288.

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendments of the Senate numbered 1, 2, 10, 16, 18, 27, 30, 32, 36, 37, 38, 45, 47, 53, 62, 68, 72, 92, 116, 118, 123, 125, 137, 138, 141, 143, 144, 145, 147, 148, 150, 151, 152, 153, 155, 157, 158, 159, 155, 166, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 177, 178, 181, 182, 183, 184, 186, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 198, 200, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 212, 213, 214, 217, 218, 219, 222, 223, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 244, 249, 251, 254, 255, 256, 258, 261, 264, 265, 268, 269, and 271, and agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 7:

That the House recede from its agreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 7, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert \$137,948,091; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 11:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 11, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows:

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The conference agreement specifies that the Export-Import Bank shall seek to provide 5 percent of their energy related financing to renewable energy projects.

PROHIBITION CONCERNING ABORTIONS AND INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATION

Amendment No. 165: Inserts section number proposed by the Senate.

AFGHANISTAN—HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Amendment No. 166: Inserts section number proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 167: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which requires that not less than \$70,000,000 be made available for the Afghanistan Humanitarian Assistance Program. This assures that the program will receive a minimum of \$70,000,000.

The conferees continue to believe that there is a need for a strong bilateral program and a large international effort to rebuild Afghanistan. The conferees admire the courage and dedication of the Afghan people to determine their own destiny, and believe that the United States should support these efforts.

The conferees are, however, concerned about the lack of focus and direction in U.S. policy in Afghanistan since the Soviet withdrawal on February 15, 1989. Unless a coherent, long-term policy direction is set for the United States in Afghanistan, the conferees fear that future support for these activities may be undermined. The ultimate success of the fundamental goal of a free Afghanistan must not be jeopardized by drift and uncertainty in U.S. policy. The conferees urge the Administration to develop and explain to Congress and the American people a clear strategy for assisting the Afghan people in bringing the war to a close.

The conferees believe that the Agency for International Development should coordinate closely its humanitarian support with the appropriate ministries of the Afghan interim government. However, the conferees see a need to strengthen the Afghan interim government's financial and managerial practices. Without such an effort, foreign donors, including the U.S. Government, will be forced to re-evaluate the future direction of our assistance program to Afghanistan.

Amendment No. 168: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which requires that \$70,000,000 shall be made available for the Afghanistan Humanitarian Assistance program. This makes the earmark for this program mandatory.

Amendment No. 169: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter stricken by said amendment, insert: *Provided, That of the funds appropriated under the heading "Private Sector, Environment, and Energy, Development Assistance", \$13,500,000 shall be transferred to "International Organizations and Programs" and made available only for the United Nations Afghanistan Emergency Trust Fund*

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The conferees have agreed to provide \$13,500,000 for the Afghanistan Emergency Trust Fund. These funds are to be derived from the Private Sector, Environment and Energy, Development Assistance account and made available to the United Nations through the International Organizations and Programs account.

PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS—DOCUMENTATION

Amendment No. 170: Inserts section number proposed by the Senate.

EL SALVADOR—INVESTIGATION OF MURDERS

Amendment No. 171: Inserts section number proposed by the Senate.

REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT

Amendment No. 172: Inserts section number proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 173: Inserts language proposed by the Senate changing the reference of "Economic Support Assistance" to "Economic Support Fund".

IMMUNIZATIONS FOR CHILDREN

Amendment No. 174: Inserts section number proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 175: Deletes subsection letter proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 176: Deletes language proposed by the Senate earmarking not less than \$50,000,000 for immunizations for children, and requiring a report by April 1, 1991 on the extent to which the goal of universal access to childhood immunization has been achieved. The conferees agreed that the Agency for International Development is to carry out in fiscal year 1990 an immunization program of at least \$50,000,000 and report to the Committee on Appropriations on the funding amount that has been made available.

ETHIOPIA—FORCED RESETTLEMENT, VILLAGIZATION

Amendment No. 177: Inserts section number proposed by the Senate.

October, 1989

NARCOTICS

--The increase in demand for poppy world-wide has contributed to greater production in Afghanistan. Poppy yields in Afghanistan increased from 300 MT in 1979 to 800 MT in 1989.

--The increase in availabilities of opium holds serious consequences for the U.S. Southwest Asia, of which Afghanistan is the largest producer, supplies poppy in quantities that amount to 40% of the United States' heroin supply.

--A component of the A.I.D. Narcotics Interim Strategy is a pilot project in which agricultural assistance has not been provided in areas where poppies are grown unless commanders in those areas are willing to cooperate in elimination efforts.

--The Narcotics Strategy incorporates the Education Sector Support Project in disseminating narcotics awareness literature. Health Sector Support Project is involved in narcotics abuse awareness and training of health workers to recognize and treat narcotics abuse cases.

--The Narcotics Interim Strategy evolved into the Narcotics Awareness and Control Project (NACP). The main components of the NACP consist of a communications/awareness program, a set of rural development/crop substitution activities, and a research effort to better the poppy problem and lessons learned from the first two components.

--A.I.D. is engaged in an on-going dialogue on the narcotics issue with the the Afghan Interim Government (AIG) and other key representatives of the resistance. Resistance leaders are constantly reminded of USG concern that everything possible is being done to eliminate poppy production in Afghanistan.

--The UN has made anti-narcotics activities a priority as well. UN Fund for Drug Abuse and Control (UNPDAC) has planned activities that include public awareness and crop substitution programs. UN Office of the Coordinator for Afghanistan (UNOCA) has budgeted \$3 million for a crop substitution program in the 1989 Plan of Action.

On September 6, 1989, President George Bush, in his first nationally televised address as President, singled out narcotics as the greatest domestic threat facing America today. To counter this threat, the President introduced a five year anti-narcotics strategy, an important element of which focuses beyond U.S. borders to those areas where narcotics are grown, processed, and sent along their way to international markets. The Narcotics Awareness and Control Project will support the President's strategy by promoting narcotics awareness among Afghans, and by restricting new opium production and, where possible, eliminating on-going poppy production in Afghanistan. It will do so cautiously and systematically and with a full understanding of the difficulties of the task.

The project, extending 42 months at a cost of \$12.5 million, is the first of an anticipated two phase program, the second phase of which is as yet undesignated. Midway through the project, an evaluation will help redirect project resources to the most effective components. A second evaluation after 36 months of implementation will provide the foundation for an amended, or new AAM. This second phase will take account of the evolution of the political situation in rural Afghanistan, as well as the lessons of the first phase.

The project has three components. The first component promotes narcotics awareness to refugees, the resistance forces and their supporting population inside Afghanistan, the resistance political leadership, and the donor community located in Pakistan. Narcotics awareness campaigns will draw the connection in the Afghan mind between narcotics production and cultivation on the one hand and drug addiction and social decay on the other through images, radio, and traveling medical/communications teams delivering highly directed messages. The religious power of Islam will be employed at every level in the society to mobilize the latent forces said to be ready to proscribe both narcotics production and use.

The second component is directed toward eliminating poppy cultivation in areas of Afghanistan where conditions lend themselves to a high probability of success. Seven to eight poppy elimination plans will be negotiated with commanders or local shuras in which A.I.D. will agree to provide development resources in exchange for an immediate poppy ban, or a gradual elimination of poppy cultivation in those instances in which an immediate ban is not a realistic option. Funds under this project will also be available for FVO-supported poppy elimination programs.

The third component of NACP will help to establish an analytical base to facilitate implementation of the project. A monitoring and evaluation unit will track those initiatives

funded in the first two components to identify successes, failures, and their determinants. Recommended program adjustments should emerge on a regular basis from this ongoing analysis. Another aspect of the component will be project-financed research that will attempt to learn more about w Afghan plant poppy and the forces that can prevent and eliminate production. The agricultural and commercial feasibility of high value export crops will also be studied.

The project will be implemented by a contractor under the policy and implementation guidance of the Mission narcotics officer. The contractor will work with and assist in the development of Afghan organizations to undertake critical elements of project implementation. In each component potential collaborators and sub-contracting implementors have already been identified.

Each of the three project components has been designed with the realization that anti-narcotics projects are among the most problematical in A.I.D.'s portfolio. Targetted beneficiaries may not perceive themselves to be beneficiaries in the same sense that beneficiaries of more traditional development activities might; and indeed farmers are invariably set back, at least financially, by successful crop substitution efforts. Along with this typical constraint of conflicting beneficiary/donor interests, the Afghanistan Narcotics Awareness and Control Project carries the atypical burden of operating in a situation of economic debilitation, political destabilization, and infrastructural deterioration. Security considerations prevent direct monitoring and contact between targetted populations and U.S. staff is not possible.

Despite these very real handicaps, we are convinced that there are opportunities for effective and successful anti-narcotics interventions for which we must position ourselves to take advantage. It's been demonstrated through an A.I.D. pilot, Project Alpha, that committed and well respected local authorities, supported with seed, tractors, and other agricultural resources, can persuade farmers to make the switch away from poppy cultivation. It is also becoming increasingly evident that the Afghans themselves are beginning to recognize that narcotics related activities are contrary to the principles of Islam and a further threat to the morality and stability of an already traumatized Afghan society.

December 1989

MINE AWARENESS/MINE DETECTION TRAINING ACTIVITIES FOR AFGHANISTAN

Millions of mines have been scattered throughout Afghanistan endangering the safe return of Afghan refugees to their homes. The number of live mines, disseminated primarily in rural areas, is significant. A.I.D., in close association with the United Nations and other donors, has thus undertaken a humanitarian effort in order to reduce the threat of mines in Afghanistan.

A.I.D.'s involvement with mine awareness/mine detection programs for Afghanistan began before the withdrawal of Soviet troops in February of 1989. Anticipating that the Soviets would leave behind countless live mines throughout the country, the Office of the A.I.D. Representative for Afghanistan (O/AIDRep) began planning for the implementation of a pilot two-pronged approach to help reduce casualties resulting from land mines. The first element is a small pilot mine awareness program. The second element is a pilot project which provides detection/demining training and assistance for Afghans using dogs trained by specialists from Thailand. The dogs were previously used successfully in similar programs along the Thai-Cambodian border.

The mine awareness pilot program was initiated in December 1988 as a sub-project of the Commodity Export Project (CEP). The sub-project experimented with the production of cloth prints (which are more durable, transportable and cheaper than conventional paper posters) for use as educational mine awareness materials. The idea is to create a general awareness of the hazards of mines and mine fields. The cloth is designed and produced jointly by the University of Nebraska at Omaha (UNO) and the Education Center for Afghanistan (ECA) under the auspices of the Afghan Interim Government (AIG) Ministry of Education and the O/AIDRep Education Sector Support Project (ESSP). The materials are disseminated in refugee camps located in Pakistan as well as schools and villages in Afghanistan. The sub-project has also developed and distributed mine awareness textbooks and has presented information on mines by means of instructional videotapes. UNO, in association with ECA, has provided the necessary technical support. The UN has developed a similar mine awareness/detection program, based on A.I.D.'s pilot project.

The mine dog pilot project, which began in June, 1989, involves the use of mine detection dogs donated by the Royal Thai Army as well as Thai Army dog trainers to instruct Afghans in mine detection techniques. While the program is currently managed and funded entirely by A.I.D., it is hoped that, if it is successful, the UN Office of the Coordinator for Afghanistan (UNOCA) will eventually assume the management of the activity as part of its larger humanitarian effort known as "Operation Salaam/Operation Safe Passage". Alternately, the AIG has indicated its intention to form its own demining capacity; the AIG might utilize the dog mine detection technology.

The Afghans have demonstrated a high level of proficiency and capacity to learn quickly in spite of the Thai-English-Pashto language barrier. Twelve Afghans and two Pakistanis graduated from the initial ten week mine dog training course on August 29, 1989. The objective was to test the value of trained dogs as a part of the major demining effort that faces Afghanistan.

At present we are in the deployment stage of this pilot project. Fourteen mine detection dogs, their Afghan handlers, assistants, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel entered Afghanistan (Paktika Province) to begin their field evaluation on September 30. This represents the first systematic effort at mine clearance using the Afghan mine dog handlers and U.N. trained deminers.

The mine dog teams returned from Afghanistan on November 11. The teams reported that they cleared approximately 137 kilometers of road leading into the town of Urgun, Paktika province. Approximately 734 mines were removed or blown in place.

The mine dog teams were scheduled to return to Afghanistan on November 23.

TALKING POINTS FOR WORKING LUNCHEON WITH ACTING PRESIDENT GAILANI

Where: Peshawar

Date: December 3, 1989

Time: 12:30 p.m.

Duration: 2 hours

N.B.: Gailani may be familiar with the O/AIDRep's democratic-pluralism initiatives (DPI). You should consult with the U.S. Mission regarding if/how this topic should be raised.

Acting President Ahmed Gailani (also the head of the "Supreme Court" and in charge of setting up new elections) is the leader of the Mahaz-i-Milli (National Islamic Front of Afghanistan) party. The party falls within the category of conservative or traditionalist (versus fundamentalist a la Hekmatyar and Rabbani). Its support is limited to Gilzai Pashtuns tribes in the east. He is the most Westernized and secular of the major resistance leaders, moderate and monarchist in beliefs and has consistently advocated a future role for the former King Zahir Shah.

- o Pir Gailani, would you please comment on your government's priorities for the near-term development of your nation? 1
- o Can you comment on the status of elections for a new Afghan government?
- o The Ministry of Agriculture has recently made great strides in organizing itself and developing an action plan. Can the USG expect to see an increase in the rapidity with which other individual line ministries are organizing themselves into viable organizations?
- o What are your views on the need for increased amounts of food inside Afghanistan? Are there particular provinces or cities (e.g., Kabul) which you see requiring increased food supplies over the winter?
- o Our A.I.D. Representative's Office is eager to increase its working relationships with the AIG. However, we are concerned about accountability for funds and commodities. How can we work together to ensure that these concerns are met?

Pir is an honorific title. You should consult with the U.S. Mission on the appropriate way to address Gailani.

TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH ABDUL HAQ - HEAD OF NEWLY
ESTABLISHED AIG SECURITY FORCE

Where: Peshawar; Abdul Haq's Compound

Date: December 3, 1989

Time: 4:30 p.m.

Duration: 1.5 hours

Abdul Haq is a member of the Hezbi-Islami-Khalis party (not to be confused with Hekmatyar's Hezbi-Islami, a distinct party). He is a commander in the Kabul region and, earlier in the war, was an extremely effective military leader against Soviet forces. His greatest exploit is the destruction of the Kabul amunition depot in 1985. Haq lost a leg fighting in 1987 (the USG financed his trip to Europe to receive an artificial limb. Accordingly, he now spends less time in Afghanistan and more time in Peshawar.

Haq is very interested in narcotics irradiation and plans to start a special narcotics force. He has other elaborate plans to strengthen and staff the security forces (including great uniforms that he's designed); establish a system of tolls and road taxes inside liberated areas in Afghanistan to raise money for the AIG and to streamline the current system of individual commanders levying their own taxes; and well as other schemes.

Haq speaks fluent English.

Talking Points

o Establishing a security department under the current conditions in Afghanistan is a monumental task. You are certainly to be commended for leading this effort. What is the current status of the department? Do you have full cooperation from the seven parties and everyone in the AIG?

o Your interest in controlling narcotics production will serve your country well. Undoubtedly, future USG support for the resistance and Afghanistan will depend on concrete success in this area. Although AID cannot provide assistance directly to you because of our regulations, we are working to ensure that other USG agencies can support you. Do you sense that poppy production in liberated areas can be significantly reduced? What are the problems that you face?

o I understand that you plan to establish a system of tolls and taxes. Will this have a negative impact on cross-border trade? (Note: that is not the extent but it's worth asking). Will individual commanders permit you to do this?

TALKING POINTS FOR LUNCHEON WITH PAKISTANI INTER-SERVICES
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Where: Islamabad

Date: December 4, 1989

Time: 1:00 pm

Duration: 1.5 hours

O/AID/Rep will provide background and talking points in Islamabad.

INTERIM AFGHAN GOVERNMENT

PRESIDENT: Prof. Sebghatullah Mojadeddi (AULF-Afghan Nat. Lib. Front)
PRIME MINISTER: Prof. Abd Al-Rab Abd Ul Rassul Sayyaf (Ittehad)
FOREIGN MINISTER: Engineer Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (Hezb-Hekmatyar)
MINISTER OF DEFENSE: Maulvi Mohammad Nabi Mohammedi (Harakat)
MINISTER OF INTERIOR: Maulvi Mohammad Ynis Khalis (Hezb-Khalis)
MINISTER OF RECONSTRUCTION: Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani (Jamiat-I-Islami)
MINISTER OF FINANCE: Mr. Hidayat Amin Arsala (NIFA)
MINISTER OF NATIONAL SECURITY: Mr. Din Mohammad (Hezb-Khalis)
MINISTER OF INFORMATION: Dr. Hajibullah Lafrate (Jamiat-I-Islami)
MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS: Engineer Ahmad Shah (Ittehad)
MINISTER OF EDUCATION: Dr. Farouq Azam (NIFA)
MINISTER OF TRIBES AND FRONTIER: Ustd Ali Ansari (Hezb-Hikmatyar)
MINISTER OF HEALTH: Dr. Sayed Mohammad Nadir Khurram (AULF)
MINISTER OF HAJ AND RELIGION: Maulvi Abdul Razzaq (Hezb-Khalis)
MINISTER OF SCIENCE AND RESEARCH: Maulvi Mohammad Islamuddin (Harakat)
MINISTER OF MINES AND INDUSTRIES: Engineer Ishan Jan (Jamiat-I-Islami)
MINISTER OF JUSTICE: Mr. Qazi Hajjullah (Hezb Hekmatyar)
MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE: Maulvi Mohammad Shah Fazli (Harakat)
MINISTER OF PLANNING: Dr. Abdul Aziz Ferough
SUPREME COURT: Pir Gailani (NIFA)

VACANT

MINISTRY
MINISTRY
MINISTRY
MINISTRY

Reserved for Shias


Water & Power
Public Works
Commerce
Transportation

MINISTRY
MINISTRY
MINISTRY
MINISTRY

Reserved for "Good Muslims from Kabul"

Higher Education
Food Supply & Dist.
Natural Resources
Social Affairs

NATURE OF GOVERNMENT



BRIEFING PAPER ON THE HEALTH WORKER TRAINING PROGRAM

Where:: Afghan National Liberation Front (Mojadiddi) Mujahideen Camp, Peshawar

Date: December 2, 1989

Time: 9:00 a.m.

Duration: 1 hour

Under the O/AIDRep-financed Health Sector Support Project, 1,606 basic health workers (BHW) have graduated from the twelve week BHW course. A BHW roughly matches international standards established by the World Health Organization for a village health worker. The BHWs are trained to diagnose and treat health problems such as malaria, diarrheal diseases, respiratory illnesses, gastro-intestinal complaints and skin infections. The BHWs have few opportunities to consult with doctors or nurses and must assume major responsibility for health coverage in their working area.

The BHWs receive supplies for six months to a year. When they return for more supplies, they are referred, at least once each year, to a 12 day refresher training program.

This training site is one of many that was set up under the project with the assistance of the project contractor, Management Sciences for Health, to train BHWs (as well as provide buddy care training to mujahideen). The Afghan Health Committee, now part of the AIG's Ministry of Health, is responsible for, inter alia, curricula development, training, management/administrative support for training programs, refresher training courses, and testing and certification. This camp was converted into a BHW refresher training camp during a recent reorganization of the training program.

- o Has the training of female BHWs, female nurses/paramedics or midwives begun yet?
- o What do the BHW themselves see as their priority once inside Afghanistan? Is curative prevention more important now than emergency trauma care?
- o How do the BHWs (and other that receive training) receive their salaries? Will those BHWs who complete the refresher training program expect a salary increase and/or opportunity to advance?
- o Is there any charge for services rendered or medication provided inside Afghanistan? Is a fee-for-service system a realistic possibility?
- o What is the actual role of the MOPH in the design, training and testing of the BHWs receiving refresher training?

BRIEFING PAPER ON SHINDAND REFUGEE CAMP

Where:: Shindand Camp near Kohat

Date: December 2, 1989

Time: 2:00 p.m.

Duration: 1 hour

N.B.: You may wish to wear a long, loose skirt and blouse for this visit. A scarf to be wrapped around head and shoulders is also advised.

Unlike many of the refugee camps around Peshawar, Shindand is not a showcase camp for dignitaries, primarily because it is not near Peshawar and access is more limited to foreign visitors.

At Shindand, you will see a broad, sprawling camp which consists of two distinct sections: the "old camp" contains 4,130 refugees; the "new camp" contains 9,781 refugees, mostly from Jalalabad, who arrived between February and May, 1989.

The camp has basic facilities -- little access to water and electricity. Both old and new camp have one basic health unit. Latrines are under construction. Life, especially for women is hard. You may see many closed compounds (typically Pathan) where an entire extended family or clan live. Women do not leave their compound (unless accompanied by a male member of the family) and, therefore, their lives frequently revolve around activities within their compound and social intercourse with other women is limited. You cannot go inside a compounded unless invited. People, especially what few women you will see, will shy away from visitors, although the children will always be around to ask for little gifts. (Remember if you give a gift to one, they all ask for something!!)

- o You may wish to ask what facilities (either Pakistani, UNHCR or PVO-provided) are available for the refugees.
- o What is the feeling about returning to their native province.
- o What assistance would they most like to receive when they return to Afghanistan (materials for housing, farm implements, food, money, etc.).
- o Are new refugees still arriving? From where? What has driven them out of Afghanistan?
- o What preconditions must exist, according to the refugees, before they will return to Afghanistan?
- o Are the social services provided in the camp adequate to meet the needs of women and girls?

(To Be Changed)

BRIEFING PAPER ON OB-GYN HOSPITAL

Where: Peshawar
Date: December 2, 1989
Time: 3:45 PM
Duration: One Hour

In response to urgent requests from the International Rescue Committee (IRC) (an O/AIDRep-funded NGO), in September, the O/AIDRep provided a one year, \$96,000 grant to IRC to fund the OB-GYN Hospital in Peshawar. The hospital is an Afghan managed institute which treats patients primarily from the local Afghan refugee population. The facility fills a high priority need in that it is the only hospital in Peshawar providing OB-GYN services by female doctors and nurses to Afghan women.

Talking Points:

- o On the average, how many women are treated in a month and what, typically are they treated for?
- o What problems do you face in operating the hospital? Do you have sufficient trained female staff?
- o How do you see the health situation facing Afghan women, both in the camps and Afghanistan? Are there opportunities to expand women's health care programs, especially inside Afghanistan?
- o Are you able to provide any maternal/child health care?

BRIEFING PAPER ON THE ACLU TRUCK FARM

Where:: Peshawar
Date: December 3, 1989
Time: 8:00 a.m.
Duration: 2 hours

In November, 1988, the O/AIDRep began to support the Afghan Construction and Logistics Unit (ACLU) in response to urgent needs to transport donated foodstuffs and other humanitarian commodities to distribution points inside Afghanistan, and to carry out basic construction and repairs on the war-damaged or neglected roads and bridges which carry these convoys.

The ACLU has been sending convoys inside Afghanistan since November 1988. Convoys are directed to a number of shuras representing all parties. No party receives undue favoritism. By the end of August, 1989, 156 convoys (ranging from ten to sixty trucks per convoy), or over 1,600 truckloads of commodities (over 8,800 tons), had been delivered inside Afghanistan. For the most part, these convoys have transported food in response to growing shortages. A rate structure has been developed and is applied for each truck in every convoy.

The ACLU currently has a fleet of 88 new seven-ton, 4x4 heavy trucks, and 30 3/4-ton 4x4 pick-ups provided by A.I.D. The ACLU also has two operational heavy equipment teams which are engaged in road rehabilitation and bridge building activities. Each unit has a crew of 140 Afghans. This unit has over 66 pieces of construction equipment.

Also see Tab B, Briefing Paper on the ACLU.

The "Truck Farm" houses the ACLU vehicles and repair facilities. Ronco (project contractor) monitors accompany each convoy.

- o How do you receive instructions as to the destination of your convoys?
- o How do the convoys travel (e.g., what kind of protection do they receive)?
- o How do you ensure that the convoys carry only humanitarian goods?

BRIEFING PAPER ON THE ASIA FOUNDATION

Where: Asia Foundation, Islamabad
Date: December 5, 1989
Time: 2:45 PM
Duration: One-Half Hour

The Asia Foundation (TAF) sent two consultants, former Ambassador to Afghanistan Theodore Eliot and Jim Dalton, to Pakistan during the spring of 1989 to investigate ways in which to promote democratic-pluralism for Afghanistan. Eliot's political analysis and Dalton's project design experience led to a preliminary strategy paper on rebuilding Afghanistan's social infrastructure.

In November 1989, TAF revised the preliminary paper. The result was a paper outlining several program activities for potential TAF and/or A.I.D. support totaling \$1.2 million. Among the program activities are: training in public administration, financial administration, foreign service, English language, business management, and leadership; legal research and studies, human rights awareness activities, training for non-governmental organizations in community development, support for professional associations, studies and observations of democratic processes and institutions, and preservation of national culture and heritage. O/AIDRep is currently reviewing the paper.

Talking Points:

- o We are pleased to learn that TAF is placing a representative and staff in the field for its Afghanistan program. How soon do you expect to have the representative's office fully staffed and operational?
- o The possibility of TAF and National Endowment for Democracy collaboration on activities for Afghanistan has been raised in the past. In light of the fact that TAF will have staff on the ground to manage activities, have TAF and NED discussed potential cooperation?
- o Which activities in your paper do you consider key to your efforts? Have you been able to identify any qualified Afghans to receive the training you outline in your paper?
- o Have you approached any members of the AIG concerning your ideas? What was their reaction/comment?

Where:: Peshawar
Date: December 3, 1989
Time: 3:00 p.m.
Duration: 1 hour

This center was formed by a group of professional Afghan women. The purpose of the center is to expand training and vocational opportunities for Afghan women in the refugee camps. As a result of cultural constraints, Afghan men have often been the exclusive beneficiaries of training and other assistance; this center offers an opportunity for women to receive further support and expand their practical training. The group is also highly conscious of the threat that religious fundamentals pose to women's programs and are careful to avoid anything that might trigger a reaction from them. Currently, the center receives \$30,000 in grant assistance from the International Rescue Committee (IRC) under the O/AIDRep-financed Rural Assistance Project. The Asia Foundation, as well as the governments of Canada and Australia, have also indicated their intention to provide grants.

In addition to IRC support, the center is seeking assistance to establish linkages with women's organizations in other Muslim countries (they are included as a potential grantee under the National Endowment for Democracy DPI proposal).

- o What is the traditional role of women in Afghanistan and in Islamic society? Are your training efforts building on these roles?
- o Do you think that expanding training opportunities for women will be acceptable to other groups in Afghanistan? Have you encountered any problems?
- o What specifically is the focus of your training efforts? Are these in line with realistic job opportunities for Afghan women?
- o Do you anticipate problems from religious fundamentalists as the Center's profile begins to increase or when activities are initiated in the camps?
- o Can you elaborate on the other programs being initiated by the Center, specifically the employment referral service, newsletter, and carpentry and kitchen gardening pr-grams?

¹ The center is also referred to as the Afghan's Women's Resource Center

COMMENTARY



COURTESY OF COMMITTEE FOR A FREE AFGHANISTAN

Repatriation of Afghan refugees will be plagued by shortages of food, shelter, and medical care in most areas of the country.

Continue U.S. Aid to Afghanistan

by Charles Wilson

Since 1982, my deepest foreign policy concern has been that of gaining Western assistance for the freedom fighters in Afghanistan and support for the civilian refugees displaced by the war. My hope has focused on a future of

peace and self-determination for the Afghan people.

The Geneva accords signed in April 1988 called for the withdrawal of all Soviet troops and a hands-off commitment from Moscow. Regrettably, during the first six months after the end of Soviet oc-

cupation, the communist government in Kabul (the PDPA) was supplied by its Soviet benefactors with more military equipment than had been given to the PDPA since the beginning of the conflict. There was no indication as of midsummer that this pipeline

would slack off or be shut down.

What should have constituted a first step toward peace—after ten years of war and nine years of brutal Soviet occupation—has been marred by continued fighting and loss of civilian lives. The extensive weapons strength of the communist Afghan army is causing serious problems for the resistance.

But perhaps the most canny move during recent months on the part of Najibullah's government has been to open Kabul to Western journalists and begin subtle yet effective public relations efforts to strengthen his government's profile in the world community and undermine support for the resistance. News reports from Afghanistan have shifted their focus from the will of the resistance and the determination of the Afghan refugees to return to their homes only under a noncommunist government to the limited view of the war from inside Kabul.

Not one story has detailed the fact that most (probably 90 percent) of the rural countryside is under mujahideen control. Populated areas administered by the resistance are beginning to benefit from medical facilities, schools, and agricultural support programs being provided by the Afghan Interim Government (AIG) based in Peshawar, Pakistan, with the backing of the United States, Pakistan, and other nations.

Justifying continued U.S. involvement in assisting the muja-

hideen will become increasingly difficult as the world's memory of the Soviet invasion fades. But such arguments exist. As Elie Krakowski stated in his article in *THE WORLD & I* (October 1988):

Just as U.S. inaction, or loss of interest in Afghanistan, could well seal the fate of the Afghans and obliterate all the gains so courageously won, so appropriate U.S. deeds could be critical in establishing a free, legitimate Afghan government able to tackle constructively the needs of the Afghan people.

Most importantly, our job is not over, and its scope is mind-boggling. Because of the destruction left behind and due to inevitable internal conflicts, it will take many years for this ravaged country to be able to support its people.

The number of hospitals and medical clinics established so far in the countryside continues to grow, but it will need to be increased rapidly in order to prevent the tragedy of widespread disease. The agricultural base for much of rural Afghanistan has been wiped out by bombing, poisoned water supply and irrigation systems, and mining of fields and roads. Many lines of transportation no longer exist. Roads are being rebuilt, but a network for transporting goods and people will be needed. Housing is also a top priority. Shelter and sanitation needs are critical.

For at least the next year, and until there is a stable government in Kabul that represents a truly free Afghanistan, emergency needs will require direct delivery of supplies to the thousands of villages and millions of refugees trying to rebuild from virtually nothing. The extent so far of the AIG ministries in administering relief aid in some parts of the country is encouraging. But, in addition to providing the AIG and local officials with valuable experience in governing (on a limited but growing scale) and spreading confidence among the Afghan population, basic humanitarian support is essential for fostering and maintaining a climate of stability in those parts of Afghanistan that are currently peaceful.

RETURNING REFUGEES

Repatriation of Afghan refugees will require an effort that has no precedent in modern history. It may involve the movement and resettlement of as much as 45 percent of Afghanistan's population. Furthermore, shortages of food, shelter, and medical care in most areas will make it difficult for many to return. A feeling of insecurity due to discord within the resistance groups adds another handicap.

Since 1980, dozens of private aid organizations have been operating both along the Afghan-Pakistani border and inside Afghanistan to help civilians and refugees. Many of these groups are already planning for the first



Mujahideen and French relief workers preparing to vaccinate Afghan villagers.

other countries are contributing to help the Afghan people win this war is a small investment—if this is the last attempt Moscow makes to annex satellites, especially through savage occupation. That is why it is essential for this country to maintain its resolve and continue vocal and material support for the Afghan cause.

It is most disturbing to hear the effects of lopsided reports from Kabul surfacing in U.S. analyses of our goals in Afghanistan. We are idealists more often than realists, and when our best-case scenario doesn't play out, the foundations of public and official support often show signs of shifting. Abandoning the resistance

too soon could cripple the eventual development of a peaceful, representative government. At worst, it could lay the groundwork for the reintroduction of Soviet personnel in some form.


POTENTIAL FOR STABILITY

Initial estimates varied on how long the Kabul regime would last without direct Soviet protection. The rapid and enormous infusion of arms and military equipment from Moscow has bought the PDPA more time than many expected. And poor planning by some of the Afghan resistance leaders in making the move from guerrilla tactics to conventional attacks on urban areas caused many observers to cast doubt on the possibility of a mujahideen victory against PDPA forces.

I do not subscribe to that pessimism. AN U.S. Ambassador Peter Tomsen said in testimony before Congress last July, "Time is on the resistance's side. . . . The U.S. policy of working toward a political settlement while continuing our support for the resistance will be successful if we have the patience and steadfastness to stay the course."

Even when the war is won, either through a collapse of Najibullah's forces or a negotiated departure of the communist government in Kabul, the battle will not be entirely over. Historically, the various ethnic groups that make up the Afghan people have governed themselves valley by valley, with a loose central government

CONTINUE U.S./AID



A lumber carousel in Paktia Province.

wave of returning refugees. With the help of these organizations, the United States and other countries will be able to assist the AIG in delivering supplies needed to support villages and towns as they rebuild.

I represent a section of east Texas far removed from world upheaval. From time to time I am asked why the United States became so deeply committed to helping this country on the other side of the world. Total U.S. assistance to the Afghan resistance and refugees may amount to as much as \$2 billion in equipment and humanitarian aid since 1980.

When Afghanistan was invaded by Soviet troops in December 1979, the free world's reaction

was largely one of resignation: "Another domino has fallen."

■

**Because of the
destruction left
behind and due to
inevitable internal
conflicts, it will take
many years for this
ravaged country to
be able to support
its people.**

■

was. There's little we can do about it." But now, because the Afghan mujahideen were not allowed to sell their lives too cheaply in what would have been a futile struggle without outside help, we are seeing what may be the first real victory against Soviet expansionism. Many countries that had been close to falling prey to the more subtle methods of communism may now think twice. Other resistance movements around the world may be less inclined to fold and die. The signal sent by the Afghan resistance is clear: Soviet occupation of a country can be reversed. What's more, communism's viability as a philosophy in the Third World is vulnerable.

What the United States and

CONTINUE U.S. AID



A Skud missile explodes at the government-controlled airport in Jalalabad during a mujahideen offensive against the city.

becoming a factor only in relatively modern times. Our greatest mistake would be to expect a Western-style democracy to emerge in this ancient country.

Projections of an anti-Western radical government—a possible twin to Iran—indicate, however, a reliance on poor research. Once the communist government in power is gone, there will undoubtedly be a period of infighting and discord before a freely chosen government is established. It will be Islamic, but to be representative it will most likely be more moderate than fundamentalist and predominantly Sunni Muslim in philosophy. Shiite Muslims—the sect followed

by the vast majority of Iranians—represent only a very small per-

■

**Repatriation of
Afghan refugees
may involve the
movement and
resettlement of as
much as 45 percent
of Afghanistan's
population.**

■

centage of Afghans. None of the seven Afghan Alliance parties based in Peshawar is Shiite.

What this means for future U.S. policy is, foremost, a need to maintain an educated understanding of the culture and religious heritage of Afghanistan, its history as a nation often caught in conflict, and its people's overwhelming desire for independence and self-determination. The Afghans will quickly resent and fight against any attempts at Western manipulation, just as they did against Soviet control.

Most Afghans are pragmatists, so a very real incentive exists to tolerate a minimum of turmoil among those who finally

govern Afghanistan: the desperate need for outside help to rebuild the country and resettle more than five million refugees and nearly two million displaced civilians. Those mujahideen leaders and commanders who have been struggling to make the interim government work know that Afghanistan will not receive the full measure of assistance it will need—beyond direct delivery of emergency relief supplies—until aid can be channeled through an accepted central governing body.

They know that emergency relief will not be enough for the long term. In fact, extending relief deliveries any longer than is necessary, without at the same time establishing mechanisms for self-sufficiency, would be damaging and would undoubtedly be resented as evidence of excessive control by outside interests.

AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE

It is a sad fact that we can't work immediate miracles, no matter how sincere our intentions. After a decade of brutal conflict, Afghanistan still faces a long period of struggle in order to fully achieve what its people have been fighting for.

It may take more than five years for Afghanistan's agricultural production to return to pre-war levels. Soviet control of the country's most valuable natural resource—natural gas—will continue for at least a while. And because the Afghan economy has been restructured to depend al-

most solely on the Soviet Union, a new marketing infrastructure will have to be created from the ground up.

Most of an entire generation has been without even basic educational resources for much of the last decade. This is potentially the most devastating obstacle for the future of a free and stable Afghanistan. Persuading as many Afghans as possible now living in Western countries who have academic and professional backgrounds to participate in rebuilding their country may be an important factor in shortening Afghanistan's struggle to function as a self-supporting nation in a rapidly changing world.

Also, placing the responsibility of managing reconstruction and resettlement programs in the hands of local Afghan leaders as soon as possible will increase the knowledge and self-sufficiency of local communities.

For the present at least, a great deal of interest has been expressed worldwide by governments willing to contribute to proposed UN assistance programs. A foundation for planning and implementation of an international effort is already in place and has been operating through voluntary organizations, UN agencies, and most important, the four Afghan Mujahideen Alliance Committees established several years ago to provide health, education, and agricultural assistance to their people.

This could change with a shift in worldview, either because

of another crisis elsewhere in the world or due to the Najibullah government's continuing success at painting a deceptive picture of the situation. The United States faces a challenge in bolstering Western resolve and trying to balance world opinion by providing coverage of resistance and AIG successes. This country has a tradition of monumental impatience. The opposite is true for the Soviet government. We can be sure that they have yet to dismiss their investment in Afghanistan as a completely lost cause.

Allowing U.S. interest in offering help to the Afghans to drop at this time would be tragic, given the extent of our commitment and investment to date. The debate over budget constraints is inevitable, especially for foreign aid programs, but we must persevere to do the best that our resources and conscience will allow to participate in rebuilding Afghanistan.

One hopes we have learned a valuable lesson from our support of the Afghan cause—that a consensus of public opinion and steady backing for a resistance effort can change the course of Soviet policy. But it is too early to claim our laurels—and we may lose them yet, if the United States turns away from giving the last 5 or 6 percent needed to help the Afghan resistance achieve victory and self-determination.

Charles Wilson is a Democratic congressman from Texas.



UNIVERSITÉ DE NEUCHÂTEL
INSTITUT D'ETHNOLOGIE



INSTITUT
UNIVERSITAIRE
D'ÉTUDES
DU DÉVELOPPEMENT

OPERATION SALAM

Seminar on the Potential for Recovery in Afghanistan
and the Role of International Assistance

Geneva, 5 - 7 May 1989

Discussion Paper No. 4

AFGHANISTAN: THE SOCIAL ASPECTS OF RECOVERY
IN A FRAGMENTED SOCIETY

By Olivier Roy

AFGHANISTAN: THE SOCIAL ASPECTS OF RECOVERY IN A FRAGMENTED SOCIETY.

by Olivier Roy

Today in Afghanistan war is the main factor of social change, through migration of refugees to Pakistan and Iran, forced urbanization (at least in Kabul), new balance of power between ethnic groups and emergence of a new leadership. The war both re-emphasized the traditional rules of power game, giving them a new expression through the political parties, but it brought also a politicization of the society, through these same parties and their political ideologies. At the same time the traditional discrepancy between central State and countryside has been considerably enlarged, added to the fact that there are presently two centers: Kabul and Peshawar.

ETHNICITY AND TRADITIONAL PATTERNS OF POWER

Afghanistan is a segmented society, with different levels of identification between an individual and segmentary groups, from extended family to ethnic identity. A qawm is the term used to design any segment of the society bound by solidarity ties: it could be an extended family, a clan, an occupational group, a village etc. Qawm is based on kinship and client/patron relationship; before being an ethnic group, it is a solidarity group, which protects its members for encroachments from the State and other qawm but which is also the scene of indoor competition between contenders for local supremacy (1). It is the basic unit of political involvement.

As far as ethnicity is concerned, one has to be cautious in using the usual ethnic maps and denominations. In fact the signification given to an ethnic denomination by somebody who accepts this denomination for himself differs from group to group. Tajik, Pashtun, Hazara, Aymaq, Uzbek, Baluch, Taymani, Pasha'y, Nuristani etc. do not designate symmetrical entities. A Pashtun is not only a pashtu speaker but somebody with a tribal identity. "Tajik" has a more restricted meaning than "persian speakers". "Hazara" bears more a religious signification than an ethnic one. It is quite impossible to define the ethnic groups as homogenous and symetric entities, that could be conceived in political terms.

SOCIOLOGICAL CHANGES

1) A new leadership

In the course of the war, a new leadership has already emerged in Afghanistan, originating mainly from the young urban middle class intelligentsia. This new leadership is made of Mujahidin field commanders, Peshawar-based bureaucrats and Kabul regime employees.

Mujahidin field commanders

The big question for Mujahidin field-commanders is to adapt to traditional society. Few of them had legitimacy according to traditional patterns (that is essentially to be the offspring of a respected family, either wealthy or religious). Hence three ways to achieve their local rooting:

- to push a new political structure, putting aside traditional notables at the risk of an open confrontation with traditional society.
- to become self-made notables along the same patterns than the former ones (that is using patronage relationships); access to weapons delivery or to humanitarian assistance is the best way to achieve such a position.
- to connect a new political structure to a traditional society, that is building a would be State from below.

Usually, the former establishment has left the country. There is no big khan fighting at the head of his tribe or clan against the Soviets. Members of the former establishment still present in Afghanistan used to join the Kabul regime. Some new governors recently appointed by the regime are former Members of Parliament from the time of the King. Big local notables feel more at ease with a regime which needs them according to the traditional patterns of power-sharing between a weak central State and strong local powers than with Mujahidin.

Among the new leadership, one has to add also the "fighting Ulemas" who head Mujahidin groups, mainly in the South, where their religious status allows them to bypass the traditional tribal segmentation. Ulemas advocate the implementation of the shariat, but not a specific political model and are more concerned with local administration than with taking the power in Kabul.

The Peshawar bureaucracy

The bureaucracy established, through foreign subsidies, by the Alliance in Peshawar is manned by the new educated middle class, opposed both to the aristocracy and to the local powers. These young urbanites either left Kabul directly for Peshawar with no or little fighting records, or have been trained in western sponsored training programs organized in Pakistan. They have the same sociological background than the Communists. Even in the "moderate" parties, the new bureaucracy is made of young educated, not of *khan* or *ulema*. But, naturally enough, most of these educated young people tend to join the radical and anti-western,

but nevertheless technocratic, Hakimiyar school of thought. Uprooted people tend to be more extremist than field commanders who are confronted with the complexity of the society.

In camps and in Pakistani towns, thousands of young Afghans are now educated either through western sponsored programs or through wahhabi madrasas. Trained as accountants, nurses, teachers, clerks, translators, mollahs or trainers in different fields, they have no future except as State employees. And there is a State in Peshawar: the parties and the Alliance.

A change also occurred in the curriculum of the Mollahs. Instead in being trained in hanafi sunni madrasas (hanafism being the more liberal islamic school of law), which have provided for centuries the afghan clergy, they are now enlisted in "wahhabi" (2) sponsored schools, which vehemently oppose sufism and introduce a more rigid and dogmatic religious thinking. This new clergy is not in phase with the older clergy and with the traditional Islam of the peasants. The difference between both clergies is not in terms of being more or less "fundamentalist" (the traditional clergy is very fundamentalist too), but in terms of being able to adapt to the traditional society. In fact the new clergy is also a urban one.

The Kabul bureaucracy

A new bureaucracy has been built in Kabul too. I do not mean by that the PDPA party structures, which I think will not survive a Mujahidin victory, but the civil servants and employees whom the Mujahidin will need anyway. The difference between this new government bureaucracy and the former one is not so much that it has become communist, but that it is more westernized (through a soviet model) and cut from the countryside. In ten years, most of the Kabul civil servants never went to the countryside and, free of the pressure of the traditions which was very strong ten years ago, are now used to a secular and modern way of life. This is particularly true for middle-class women. How the people will adapt to the future is not known.

In these conditions the discrepancy has grown all along the war between the government elite and the Mujahidin elite, not in sociological terms (both are urbanites) but in ideological terms. The Mujahidin elite has become more fundamentalist, the government elite more westernized.

2. Urbanization

Exile to Pakistan or Iran means urbanization for many Afghan refugees. First strictly *sensu* because hundreds of thousands of Afghans are living or working in cities, but also because life in camps tends to create a urban atmosphere: women are secluded, there are schools, dispensaries and administration; traditional leaders have lost their power in favour of young educated middlemen (except perhaps in the Quetta camps). People are either idle or working outside in non-agricultural activities. A refugee camp is closer to the new suburbs than are mushrooming in Third World big cities than to an afghan village. A lot of these refugees are unlikely to go back to their former villages and will probably go to Kabul, if they return.

Internal displacement inside Afghanistan also resulted in urbanization. If pro-Mujahidin cities like Herat and Farah saw a decrease in population, pro-government towns like Mazar, Farah, Jellalabad and even Kabul have been swollen up.

The question is to know whether Afghanistan is still a peasant society. Urbanites tend to be more ideologically minded than peasants. The urbanization of the Mujahidin refugees might induce a radicalization of their political and ideological stands. We might witness three attitudes:

- a fear of Kabul inhabitants (even if they are anti-soviet) facing a possible Mujahidin victory, except if the big field commanders, whose political maturity has been proved through the war, are in charge.

- a resentment of the rank and file Mujahidin against all urbanites (either from Kabul or from Peshawar), leading to harsh treatment of the captured cities and distrust towards the Peshawar bureaucrats and perhaps the returning refugees.

- a hatred, based on mere fanaticism, from militant refugees returning to Afghanistan just to fight and to occupy the big cities, under the leadership of petty local commanders or returnees, thus bypassing the established field commanders.

A last problem will be the attitude of peasants towards returning land-owners. If most of the refugees go back to the countryside, there will be not enough land for tenants. Wages and shares of the crops will fall. Let us not forget that birth rate is very high, specially among refugees: it is probable that the whole afghan population has increased in ten years despite the war casualties. It will reinforce the trend towards urbanization.

Urbanization will lessen the political weight of the field commanders and increase political instability, the main factor of stability being precisely the field commanders.

ETHNIC CHANGES

The war brought a new ethnic balance. There is a larger proportion of Pashtun among refugees. A significant part of the Pashtun who established themselves in North Afghanistan during the last hundred years (the *pagel*) went back to the South or Pakistan. Large scale nomadism, which involved only Pashtun tribes, has almost disappeared. So the weight of the traditionally dominant Pashtun has been reduced, but not the pretensions of the Pashtun to rule Afghanistan. The opposition between Durrani on one side, and Ghilzay and Eastern Pashtuns on the other side made the emergence of an "all Pashtun" party improbable. In fact, the war meant a transfer of political leadership from Durrani to Ghilzay: most of the communist leadership is Ghilzay and Eastern Pashtun as are at least four of the seven Peshawar based Alliance leaders.

The war brought an ethnic reassertion among Hazaras, who now have their own political parties. A "new" (in terms of denomination) ethnic group might emerge: the Tajik (the term was never used by the "persian speakers" to refer to themselves but began to be introduced through foreign influence). Aymaq, Taywani, Tisouri etc. who were listed as separate ethnic groups by the ethnologists do not behave differently from the other persian speakers in terms of political affiliation. Of course there are some constant patterns linking the ethnic asp with the political asp (3), but the key issue to understand local politics is more the gawm affiliation than the ethnic one. If ethnic affiliations might play a big rôle in future Afghanistan, it will not be done along political and ideological party divisions, because there is no "single ethnic issue" party: there are persian speaking military commanders in Hezb Helmatyar and in Hezb Khales, and Pashtuns in Jamiat. In Kandahar, one can find all the parties. The Harakat-i Enqelab is uniformly spread among all afghan ethnic groups, due to its clerical nature.

THE FUTURE OF THE STATE STRUCTURE

The ambivalence of the process of politicization in Afghanistan is obvious. On one hand it gives a new look to traditional segmentation, but on the other hand it introduces political references (for instance to a specific ideology, which fact is very alien to traditional society) and new structures. Field commanders have created a local administration (distinct from the Peshawar bureaucracy) using prerogatives of the former central State: there are Committees dealing with Finance, Health, Culture etc.. They collect taxes and might establish their own judicial power. The notion of State-structure is no more seen as alien to the society; the communist State in Kabul is challenged by an elusive islamic State. But these new state structures do not have a head. Mujahidin have reinvented administration and bureaucracy but not the State.

On the other hand, it is not rare to see Mujahidin field commanders, mainly the petty ones, behaving like former notables and using the political fragmentation in order to express and enhance the traditional gawm segmentation. They tend to play the new political game with the old rules. The party is like the central State which is used to enhance a local status, not to achieve a nation-wide, ideologically minded project. The traditional power status in Afghanistan is an incentive to both political affiliation and political segmentation. Subordination of local notables and commanders to an amir is possible only if the leader is a charismatic and/or religious figure, or if the level of politicization is so high that discipline exists. So both external and internal divisions among the resistance parties do not come only from the passive segmentation of the society but also from the dynamic of power status.

The rooting of modern political party structures in Afghanistan could either bypass the traditional segmentation (like in the North-East) or, on the contrary (in Center North), give a new boost to infra-political, infra-ethnic, and even infra-tribal segmentation, that is the gawm level: a local petty notable, followed by some dozens of parents and tenants, could suddenly regain some power by joining a party which is rival of the dominant party and provides him with enough weapons and money to be above the new law and to act as an independant actor. These local petty

notables would not have politically expressed themselves before the war, but they now find in political affiliation an access to weapons and a new self assertion, making it more difficult for the dominant party and leader to assert themselves as a political alternative above the traditional segmentation. Such petty notables do not necessarily have a territorial basis (so they are neither feudals nor war-lords), but their simple presence as an independent network is enough to block the process of implementation of a would-be State structure. For example, petty notables will ask Voluntary or UN agencies for direct help on the ground that the local big leader is not of the same ethnic/ political/ religious/ family/ and/or geographic background as they are; they generally find a sympathetic ear among the PVOs, which, incidentally, are as tribalized and segmented as the Afghan society.

To summarize, in the North, the pattern is either large scale party structures (North East), mainly Jamiat, or collapse into anarchy (Center North); politicization could either trigger the emergence of would-be State structures or a collapse into the utmost segmental infightings. On the other hand, in the South, loose political affiliations could allow tribal areas to find some original patterns of coordination through traditional institutions and customs; traditional structures either remain untouched or, more often, tend to adapt to new patterns of organization (like shura headed by a traditional cleric).

A specific case is that of Hezb Hekmatyar which tends to carve relatively small pockets into the map of Afghanistan, East of a Kandahar-Maymana line (there is almost no Hezb West of this line); but these pockets, from where all the other organizations are expelled, are strong and homogenous. Interestingly enough, they generally correspond to local minority ethnic groups (Pashtuns in North East): as usual, gawm determinations fit with political motivations.

THE FUTURE

Whatever the future evolution of the war, there will be no State-appointed outsiders as local administrators for years, first because the war has stressed the traditional distrust of local communities against central State, secondly because the Mujahidin field commanders have established a local administration which, even when it is not shaped as a would-be State administration, will oppose any appointment made by any central government.

If we take as granted that no strong central government will be in charge for years, the reconstruction of Afghanistan has to be done at the local level, working with the de facto political authorities. It does not mean, as superficial observers used to say, that the Peshawar parties are losing their influence, but that there is a growing discrepancy between the Peshawar bureaucrats and the field commanders, who anyway retain their political affiliation and try to combine a modern political structure with a traditionally segmented society.

The Alliance in Peshawar, either directly or through a transition government established under its auspices, pretends not only to embody the

legitimacy, but also to act as a Counter-State. This Alliance has already committees working as would-be ministries. To establish its power inside Afghanistan, the Alliance will have to deal with the local field commanders along the same patterns that any State would have followed before the communist Coup, except that for the first time a large part of rural Afghanistan is now ruled by people who think of themselves as "administrators" and "Statesmen", not as "warlords" or *khans*.

The contradiction today is not only between Town and Villages, traditional Notables and Intellectuals, but also between a fledgeling would be State from below and an imported State, both manned by young intellectuals. The discrepancy between Peshawar and the inside fronts is growing, not so much politically as psychologically. Even if the Alliance takes Kabul and remains united, it will not be able to administer the country. The only possible compromise would be if the new State in Kabul, whatever it is, makes room for the field commanders, thus restraining the ambitions of the thousands of foreign based intellectuals, but creating a bitterness among the latter that could be used by foreign countries to challenge any State power in Kabul.

If field commanders and the Alliance do not find the ground for a compromise, they both will be bypassed by instability which will take the shape of tribal and ethnic feuds. In case of political chaos, most people will revert to traditional affiliations, whether on the base of the *qawm* or of the larger ethnic identities which the war has forged or reinforced. In case of a general crisis, communal identity is the only identity which does not prove to be controversial. But it is too soon to say now if, for example, a Pashtun from Kandahar will react as a Pashtun, or a Durrani or an Atchekzay.

In the case of a crisis between field commanders and any Mujahidin central State, based on the Peshawar bureaucracy, one of the possible scenarios might be the Lebanonisation of Afghanistan: collapse of the central State and emergence of antagonist communities whose identity is based on ethnic, religious and historic references, disguised under superficial contemporary political references. Lebanon has shown us that modern elites can lead their own country into a political collapse. But the worse case scenario is not sure in Afghanistan and it is too soon to know how ethnicity will play a role.

NOTES:

(1): For the definition of a qum see Pierre Oantlivres, Un bazar d'Asie Centrale, Wiesbaden, Reichert, pp158/159, Whitney Azoy, Buzkashi. Game and Power in Afghanistan, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982, pp 31/32, Roy, Islam and resistance in Afghanistan, (Cambridge University Press, 1986), chapter 1.

(2): Wahhabism refers in Afghanistan either to the indian muslim reformism which flourished in the XIX th Century and is now represented by the Movement Ahl-i Hadith, or by the Saudi strictly speaking Wahhabi religious school of thought. But the difference is now of lesser interest because the ahl-i hadith movement is subsidized by the Saudis.

(3): See my book L'Afghanistan, islam et modernité politique, Le Seuil 1985. The Pashtun "fundamentalist" groups are not so well rooted among Durrani tribal areas, but quite well among the eastern Pashtuns, mainly through Khales (Zadran and Khugiani tribes; but Hekmatyar has good implantation among Shinwari); Hekmatyar won the majority of the pashtu-speaking pockets in the North-East, from Ghilzay origin, (in Baghlan, Takhar, Kunduz), where tribalism has disappeared as a social order (but not from the memory of the former tribesmen, who still retain the name of their tribe, but have given up tribal institutions like jirgah). Jamiat has the upper hand among persian speakers. Two factors are here important: sociological (tribal/non tribal) and ethnic (Pashtun/non Pashtun). Gaylani and Mojaddidi are stronger among Pashtun tribesmen in the South.

Islam in the Afghan Resistance

by Olivier Roy

*This was first published by
Keeston College, Bromley in April 1984*

The Afghan Resistance sees its struggle more in terms of a "holy war" (jihad) than as a war of national liberation. In a country in which reference to the "nation" is a very recent phenomenon, where the State is perceived as exterior to society and where allegiance belongs to the local community, Islam remains the sole point of reference for all Afghans.

It is only in the southern Pashtun tribal zones and among emigrants that ideologies of a secular nature (nationalism and liberalism) play a role. This is understandable in that these tribes are the originators of the Afghan State—which remains tribal and Pashtun: the tribal leaders remain unattached to the religious institutions and their power derives from the tribal code (Pushtunwali) which is quite different from the Muslim law (Sharia). Moreover, the mullah (Muslim priest) has little standing in the tribal zones—whereas, for the other ethnic groups (Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek) and for the more or less deracinated Pashtuns of the Kabul and Nangarhar regions, Islam provides the political ideology of the Resistance.

However great differences are apparent in the manner in which the religion is being reinterpreted in terms of political ideology, leadership and the organisation of society. These differences, combined with the ethnic patchwork which characterises Afghanistan; explain the multiplicity of political parties in the Resistance. Let us briefly review the nine principal parties before examining in detail the evolution of the religious structures during the war period and the reference being made by the civil population to Islam as it organises itself to face the communist regime.

There are six large Sunni and three Shi'a parties (leaving aside small splinter groups). They can be divided into two tendencies: traditionalist and Islamist. The Sunni traditionalists are: Syed Ahmed Gailani's National Islamic Front (Mahaz-i-Milli-i-Islami), a product of a branch of the sufi Qadiriya order; Subhatallah Mujaddidi's National Liberation Front (Jabha-i-Milli-i-Nejad), originating from a branch of the sufi Naqshbandi order; and Mohammed Nabi Mohammadi's Islamic Revolutionary Movement (Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami) which embodies, principally, the traditional clergy. These three parties are allied and are strongest in the Pashtun south. The traditionalist Shi'a party is called the Revolutionary Council of the Union of Afghanistan (Shura-i-Inqilab-i-Estefaq-i-Afghanistan); it represents the greater part of the Hazara Shi'a ethnic minority which is concentrated in East-Central Afghanistan; the party's management is provided by the traditional clergy, in particular by the Syed (descendants of the Prophet). The Shura is the most clerical of all the parties in the Resistance.

The Islamist parties consist of the Jamiat-i-Islami, led by Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, the most powerful party in the Resistance, essentially non-Pashtun, whose followers are found in the west and north of the country; and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami, well organised and very

sectarian, to be found in most regions but especially among the Pashtun minorities in the north-east. Another Hezb-i-Islami, resulting from a split in the party referred to above, is that of Younis Khalis, to be found in the Nangarhar and Paktia regions. The two Islamist Shi'a parties are Sheikh Asaf Mohseni's Harakat-i-Islami, which recruits in the Shi'a towns and has active fronts in Kandahar, Kabul and particularly in Mazar-i-Sharif, and the extremist Hazara party Nasr, pro-Khmerist and armed by Iran, drawing its recruits from the young Hazara working in Iran. Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami and Nasr represent revolutionary Islamist officialism and their fight is more against the other parties, whom they accuse of feudalism and pro-Westernism, than against the Soviets.

However, any classification such as that above remains very abstract unless a concrete study is made of the traditional religious figures of Afghan Islam and their evolution during the war of resistance. Such an analysis will make it much more easy to understand the complexities of the Afghan Resistance.

The religious figures of Afghan Islam

These are the village mullah (priest), the alim (plural ulama) or doctor of Islamic law (called Maulavi in Afghanistan), the charismatic religious leader (and in particular the pir, leader of a tariqa—which is a mystic Muslim sufi order) and finally the young Islamic intellectual, described in Europe as "fundamentalist" and whose appearance on the Afghan religious scene is very recent.

1. The Village Mullah

The mullah belongs to the village and not to a clergy. He is not aware of belonging to an organised body. He has little to do with the superior clergy (the maulavi) from whom he receives neither payment nor his investiture. It is the consensus of the village which invests the mullah with his office either because he has shown remarkable individual distinction through his piety (and, more rarely, through his knowledge) or because he comes from a particular family or indeed (in tribal areas) from a professional group which has traditionally specialised in the provision of the mullah. (In the latter case the mullah is often non-Pashtun).

The social status of the mullah varies considerably. It is low in tribal areas because of his exclusion from the tribal community and his assimilation into the despised professional groups; in other areas, his prestige grows in proportion to the extent of his personal knowledge and the importance of his family. The mullah is seldom wealthy and frequently tills the soil. If the richer villagers contribute more than the others to the support of the mullah, this does not mean that he is thereby linked organically to the group of landed property owners. Ill-informed about political life (which is centred in Kabul) and having little political consciousness, for there is no centralised and organised clergy in Afghanistan, the mullah


reacts to communist penetration only when it reaches his village.

2. The Ulama or Maulavi (doctors of the law)
The clergy is no more organised in Afghanistan than it is in the other Sunni countries. The "senior clergy", ulama or maulavi, may be defined as a body more as a result of the way in which it has been trained than because of its position in the political structure.

Until the 1950s the ulama were trained in a non-governmental network of theological schools (madrasa) constituted around local religious personalities. After several years of study, the student of religion either obtained his master's authorisation to become a maulavi—and even to open his own madrasa—or else continued his theological studies abroad (in India until 1947, then either in Pakistan or, for the most gifted, at al-Azhar in Cairo). It was only from 1951 that the Afghan State showed enough concern to open a network of state madrasa in the provincial capitals with a curriculum leading to entry to the theological faculty of Kabul, which is an integral part of the state university. Those who graduate from this state network are more open to modern ideas and resemble the Islamist intellectuals of whom we shall speak later. They are generally very politically aware. However, the Afghan maulavi come essentially from the non-governmental network—and this is always the case in the Resistance. Having been trained in conformity with the millennial curriculum, common to the whole Muslim world (classical Arabic, *Islam* or theology, *tafsir* or interpretation of the Koran, *hadith* or tradition of the Prophet, *fikh* or civil religious law) the ulama feel that they belong to the universal Muslim community (the *umma*) rather than to a particular nation. There is certainly an energetic culture and one of repetition, but also a universalist culture. It nevertheless scarcely manages to provide an ideology capable of thinking in modern terms. As in all Muslim countries, the ulama as a whole have not known how to adapt to the modern world. They became relegated to the fringe of society both economically (the Afghan ulama have never been great property owners) and politically (the modern State depended from its foundation on the tribal elite and, since the sixties, has relied on a technocratic class that has been either liberal in character or Marxist-orientated).

We must however note the presence, from the sixties onwards, of a small minority of teachers at the theological faculty of Kabul who have been trained as traditional ulama at the University of al-Azhar in Cairo and yet possess a much more modern culture. Examples are Gholam Niaz, Dean of the Faculty of Theology, imprisoned under Prince-president Daoud and assassinated under the communist regime, and Rabbani, current President of the Jamiat-i-Islami. These two were to play a great part in the politicisation of the student youth during the sixties and in the forging of a link between the traditionalist ulama and the young Islamist revolutionaries.

USSR



3. The charismatic leaders of the sufi orders (Muslim mystics)

There is one figure who played a considerable political role in the tribal areas in the nineteenth century and in the first half of the twentieth century. This is the charismatic mullah, a particular type of pir (elder) or spiritual guide. In the midst of the turbulence and segmentation of the tribe, at times of great crisis, the unifying figure could come only from outside—from the syed, from the sufi orders or in the person of the charismatic mullah (the "mad mullah" as he is called by the English). The call to jihad transcends clannish or tribal conflicts and brings (very provisional) unity to the tribes. This was true for the Pushtuns on both sides of the border and in the cases of the Akhund of Swat, of Mullah-i-Laag at Khoni, in 1924, and of the Shami Pir of Paktia and the Faqir of Ipi at the same period. It is significant that no phenomenon of this type has appeared in the present resistance movement. Is this one of the signs of the crisis in tribal institutions? Certainly. In any case, the kind of war waged by leaders of this kind would be quite inappropriate for modern guerrillas.

The question of the place of sufism in the Resistance remains. Sufism has always played a big role in anti-colonialist movements. In Soviet Turkistan the opposition to communism came from the sufi orders rather than from the "official" clergy. Moreover, two of the Afghan Resistance parties (of so-called "moderate" or "secular" tendency) are directed by the leaders of the two most fully represented sufi orders in Afghanistan: Sibghatullah Modjaddidi (of the Naqshbandi order) leads the National Liberation Front and Syed Ahmed Gailani (of the Qadiriya order) the Islamic Front.

However, sufism has become established in Afghanistan in two quite distinct practical religious forms:

a) The brotherhood (or tariqa) which assumes individual adherence, an intellectual initiation and personal allegiance to the master.

The brotherhood is essentially a spiritual exercise club which does not cut the practising member off from his life in society (and which indeed sometimes underpins professional solidarity with religious solidarity). It offers the believer the opportunity to supplement his spirituality whilst adhering to perfectly orthodox theology. This form of sufism, which was incarnated above all by the Mujaddidi family, is thus in no way opposed to the Islam of the ulama for whom the Mujaddidi family acted as spokesmen at times (eg in the struggle against Amanullah's reforms in 1928). This category of sufism finds its recruits mainly among the cultivated and traditionalist urban lower middle classes, particularly in Kabul and in the north and west of Afghanistan. In the Resistance, it has provided valuable officers and some good combat groups, those concerned having been broken-in to group discretion and solidarity. But there have been no mass movements, for this conception of sufism has always been elitist. That is why, of the two fronts in the non-tribal areas, only that of the Mujaddidi has attracted some partisans. It does not exercise control over the civilian population but is well-organised on the outskirts of urban districts. Gailani is not represented in the non-tribal areas.

b) Maraboutism which assumes the collective allegiance of a clan or tribe to a family of "saints", supposedly

endowed with a hereditary baraka (divine beneficent force), and which sanctifies, by proxy, a community—whose customary religious practices are in no way modified by this allegiance.

Here, contrary to the case of the true tariqa, adherence implies no specific religious practice (eg meditation, initiation). The only mark of adherence is the annual visit to the pir and the offering to him of a "gift". An institutionalised form of the pir phenomenon which is perpetuated hereditarily in the form of a sufi order: it is indeed the essential nature of the Qadiriya in Afghanistan.

4. The Islamist intellectuals

Islamism is a recent phenomenon in the Muslim world. Islamism attempts to think of Islam in terms of a political ideology which is fit to compete with the great ideologies of the West (liberalism, Marxism, nationalism). It borrows the conceptual framework of western political philosophy (the sense of history, the State, the search for a definition of politics) and endeavours to fill it with the traditional concepts of Muslim thought. The most influential thinker among both Shi'as and Sunnis is the Iranian Ali Shariati. The young Islamist intellectuals—who are mainly under 35—are the products of modernist enclaves within the traditional society. The word *roshanfekr* (intellectual) is applicable to any young man who has passed through the modern educational system, whether he claims to be liberal, Marxist or Islamist. In this sense, all these young men share very much the same background and face the same problems. The Islamists are products of the network of state institutions: high schools, faculties (mainly scientific)—but also state

modernism and the Kabul theological faculty. Their links with the main body of ulama who come from the non-governmental madrasas are therefore, by definition, very ambiguous. Although they may have the same points of reference (Qu'ran, Sunna, Sharia) their position with respect to politics is quite different. By quoting the times of the divine Revelation they circumvent the tradition which generates the main body of ulama. It is this reference to origins which allows them to think along "modern" lines (as in the case of the resistance Protestants).

These young Islamists became actively militant on the university campus from 1968, against the royalist (and subsequently presidential) regime of Daoud, against the communist penetration of the army and the university and against the Soviet infiltration of the State apparatus. They went out into the country, preaching political sermons, and attempted in vain, an armed uprising in 1975. Their relationship with the ulama remained very distant until 1970 when the traditionalist clergy also began to be concerned about communist penetration. Violently repressed from 1975, they suffered imprisonment (and execution at the hands of the communists in 1979) or went into exile in Pakistan until 1980.

Their movement Sazman-i-Jawana-i-Muselman (Organisation of Islamic Youth) gave birth to the three Sunni Islamist parties (the Jamiat and the two Hezb-i-Islami) which constitute the backbone of the Resistance.

The Shi'a youth also became caught up in political movements. They were particularly subject to Maoist and Hazara nationalist influences (which disappeared in the Resistance). It seems that a movement comparable to the Sazman existed among the Shi'as, incarnated by Sheikh Asaf Mohseni. Entitled Sobh-i-Danesh (dawn of knowledge), this movement appears to have been cultural rather than political. Its members later became very active in the Resistance in support of the Harakat-i-Islami (not to be confused with the Harakat-i-Inqilab) led by the same Sheikh.

The evolution of the religious figures in the Afghan Resistance

1. **Village mullah and traditional maulawi**
Lacking political awareness and ill-informed about events in the capital, most of these did not react immediately to the communist coup d'état in April 1978. It was not until there was direct interference by the communists at village level that their call for a holy war was launched (without their having received any directives from the Peshawar organisations—of which they were completely ignorant). Three elements provided them with an impetus: the agrarian reform which called into question the notion of private property, guaranteed by the Qu'ran; the enforced literacy programme, considered to be closer to political indoctrination than to education (and, in particular, the directive that girls had to attend lessons conducted by men); and finally the massive, indiscriminate arrest of local maulawi in 1979. The uprisings began in the summer of 1978, culminating in spring 1979. The general pattern was always the same: in the course of the Friday sermon, at the local mosque, the mullah and maulawi called on the population, already in ferment against the regime, to translate their feelings into actions. The people then attacked and seized the local government post, suffering heavy losses because of their lack of arms. Once the district had been liberated, the leaders of the uprising sent emissaries to Peshawar to obtain arms from the bureaux that had been set up there. In cases where Islamist intellectuals (of whom we shall speak again later) were present, the local mullah and maulawi adhered to the Islamist parties (in Herat, Ghor and the north east). However, in most cases, they adhered to the Harakat-i-Inqilab which was seen from the outset, as the rallying point of the traditionalist clergy. This party had a clear majority during the first year of the war against the Soviets (1980) but its influence has


steadily declined, specially in the non-Peshawar areas, in favour of the Jamiat-i-Islami. This loss of influence is due to the difficulty encountered by the traditional clergy in assuming the role of military and political leaders, for which they were scarcely prepared.

2. **Charismatic leaders of the sufi orders**
As we have seen, the tribal areas (thus the Peshwars in the south-east) provide favourable terrain for the production of charismatic leaders and sufi orders of the marabout type. However, not only has no religious charismatic leader figure emerged during this war, but the two parties founded by pir in these regions (Mujaddidi, but especially Gailani with his national Islamic Front) are essentially tribal and secular; they constitute, in the Resistance, the royalist, pro-western, "moderate" pole, speak on behalf of the old regime establishment and are in opposition to the other "secular" parties.

All these epithets may be seen to have a common link: These two parties are "tribal" because their social basis is constituted essentially by the tribes—for whom they perform the function of "mediation", previously devolving upon the charismatic pir.

There is a link with the "royalist" milieu because the monarchy in Afghanistan is tribal in origin, and with the "establishment", at least in the case of Gailani. This great family enriched by the annual gifts of the faithful—but swiftly divested of all real spiritual preoccupation—became integrated into the upper middle class of Kabul by investing its money there. (Gailani was the Peugeot representative for Afghanistan).

The two parties can also be called "secular", less because of sufiism (we have seen that the Mujaddidi family spoke on behalf of the ulama in 1928) than on account of tribalism, based on the tribal code (Pursh-runwali) and on the power of traditional dignitaries who have had no connection with the religious institutions. (A tribal leader, contrary to the practice of the mediaeval



European aristocracy, will never send his child to study theology; the status of the mullah is inferior to that of a warrior in the tribal areas. Thus, tribalism would have everything to lose through the return of the ulama—not to mention the Islamists.

The only problem is that the two parties suffer all the defects of the tribal system without providing an organisation or an ideology capable of overcoming them. The defects are those of patronage, the inability to wage modern guerrilla warfare (tribal war is always based on raid and plunder), segmentation (each class or tribe attends first to its own particular interests) and partitionism (the secular parties claim to be fighting a war of national liberation but their only definition of the nation is that of a tribal confederation united in a jirga or tribal assembly).

3. The return of the *Islamist intellectuals*. Exiled to Pakistan from 1975, well before the communist coup d'état, the young Islamists had maintained a political structure in the form of two well-organised parties. The more important of these until 1981 was Hekmatyar's *Hezb-i-Islami* (from which the Khalis maulavi broke away in 1979); then came Rabbani's *Jamiat-i-Islami* which is now dominant. Both of these, organised like modern political parties, with an information section, a military section, a cultural committee etc. maintained a slender clandestine network within the country under the communist government.

After the spontaneous uprising of 1979, they returned from exile to organise the Resistance. They were very unevenly distributed: plentifully in the north-east quarter (Panjshir, Baghlan, Kunduz, Mazar) and in Herat (in other words in the more educationally advanced, Persian speaking areas and close to towns) but sparsely in the tribal areas and the more remote regions. The acceptance of these young intellectuals depends on their relations with the local ulama. With the *Jamiat* and the Khalis party, this partnership has been successful whilst in Hekmatyar's party, the young radicals have often shown themselves to be hostile towards the traditionalists (particularly towards the brotherhoods). The partnership is closest where the ulama have been educated in the state madrasa, which are strongly influenced by the *Jamiat-i-Islami*.

In most cases, these young men, who have a more political and a more modern vision of Islam, have proved to be better military commanders and better organisers than the ulama (and better still than the tribal chiefs). An example is the Panjshir Commander, Massoud. Thirty years old, a Muslim youth militant since 1972, having had a scientific (polytechnic school) training, he is indisputably the best military leader in the Afghan Resistance. He is one of the few to understand the necessity of setting in motion a modern guerrilla warfare apparatus (mobile groups, trained commandos) unlike the traditional Afghan method of waging war (mass rising, followed by a long period of inactivity, static concentration at central points, non-specialised troops). Other examples are Zabiullah of Mazar (trained at the governmental madrasa) and Ismail Khan (a former officer)—both of the same age and seasoned *Jamiat* militants, like Massoud.

The maintenance of a society based on law

The great originality of the Afghan Resistance is that, in the areas administered by the resistance, a military power (the members of the Resistance) co-exists with a civil power (the qazi or religious judges, who are either *mulah* or *maulavi*).

Certainly, as is always the case in wartime, the abuse of power by those possessing arms is always possible; but where the Resistance is well ordered or where the civilian society has remained dominant, the organisation of civil justice is in the hands of the clergy who, even if they generally belong to the dominant party in the area, constitute an entity which is independent of the military leaders.

We are witness to an "Islamicisation" of civilian society. Indeed, under the old regime, justice tended to be administered by government functionaries in the well-controlled regions and the local dignitaries in the more remote areas. Now, however, the state functionaries, who applied state (and therefore secular) law, have disappeared and the traditional dignitaries have widely lost prestige. It is the qazi, who are normally products of non-state madrasa, who administer justice according to Muslim law

(Sharia). The peasants clearly favour this development.

The qazi of the Resistance are less corrupt than were those of the old regime and the system of norms that they apply is familiar to the peasantry and corresponds largely to their aspirations (unlike the reforms instituted by the communist regime). Let us take the status of land as an example. The Afghan tenant farmer was demanding not a share of the land, but the abolition of usury; and this the new qazi are striving to secure. Similarly, Islamic law guarantees the maintenance of collective rights (water, pasture and fallow land) and the end of state monopolies (the mines). Finally, the procedures of Islamic law (appearance before the qazi, friends acting as lawyers, negotiation by word of mouth, swiftness of operation) make justice more transparent to the peasant than do the slow and bureaucratic processes of a state justice which he associates with the town and with corruption.

Thus we see that the Afghan Resistance, very far from representing the mere shake-up of a traditional, obdurate society, is producing profound modifications in the religious sociology of Afghanistan. The evolution is certainly very uneven, since certain regions, like the tribal areas, are less affected by this "Islamicisation" of society. The *Islamicist* intellectuals are few in number; the closure of the state madrasa is making the training of good ulama difficult. However, in many places, and particularly among the northern *tarika*, the non-state madrasa have re-opened. There are instances of young Islamists attempting to re-open modern curriculum schools (Panjshir, Herat). But the Afghan Resistance does possess a political, military and even cultural dynamism which is making its mark in the contemporary process of Islamic revival—sufficient to distinguish it from the *beumachi* movements of Central Asia which, faced with the triumphant bolshevism of the twenties, could only be seen as representing the last strand of an ossified society. But, whatever its destiny may be, the Afghan Resistance, confronted with a communism which no longer convinces even its own troops, is taking the shape of an *avant-garde* movement.

Olivier Roy

Food Aid for Afghanistan

Dr Frances D'Souza is a Research Fellow at the Food Emergencies Research Unit, International Disaster Institute and the Department of Human Nutrition of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and the University of London. She is the author of a research document "The Threat of Famine in Afghanistan" published by Afghanistan in May 1984.

The political and academic debate as to whether or not rural communities in certain regions of Afghanistan are at present starving is probably inevitable for at least two reasons. First most aid agencies whether private, voluntary or governmental are acutely aware of the political ramifications of

clandestine humanitarian gestures in a country occupied by the Soviets. Secondly, the difficulties of getting sound information on which populations are most severely affected are immense in a country such as Afghanistan and they are greatly compounded by the fighting. A sad corollary is that TV pictures of beleaguered families barely surviving in caves are hard to come by and therefore there is little publicly-expressed outrage which could be used to stimulate political action.

The worst outcome would be widespread and outright famine among the civilian population in Afghanistan—if only because at that stage any action however generous would be too late. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate why Afghanistan must be seen as highly vulnerable to famine and what

kind of early action could be taken to prevent catastrophe.

Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world. Before the Soviet occupation the almost wholly rural population was on a subsistence economy and in spite of sustained aid programmes there was little improvement in such basic services as primary health care, education or agricultural production. Life expectancy for adults was 40 years of age—the lowest in the world and infant mortality was estimated at 182 per thousand live births, by far the highest rate in the world.

Five years of war exacerbated this extreme poverty and fragile economy; many communities have simply been destroyed.

Apart from direct destruction of villages and fields the war is undermining the economic bases of Afghan rural life. The

PAKISTANI FOOD

Even though we sometimes think that the same kinds of food seem to appear on Pakistani tables at both lunch and dinner, day in and day out, if you give yourself a chance to know Pakistani food you will be delighted by an extremely subtle and varied cuisine. Mainstays are wheat, rice, milk products, beef, lamb, chicken, vegetables and fresh fruit. Pork, of course, is never eaten. A "curry" consists of meat or vegetables, cooked in a mixture of oil or yoghurt and freshly ground spices (masala). A good masala is not overwhelmingly hot -- too many chillis are a sign of poor cooking. Good cooks know what spices are correct in each particular dish and improvise minute variations on the proportion and the precise order in which they are added in the cooking process. Spices and fresh herbs are used to complement the color of a dish also. "Mughlai" cooking in the tradition of the Mughul empire is particularly elaborate. Cooking is simplest in the Northwest Frontier and based on man-kabib-polau dishes.

If you are asked to eat in a village, or at the house of a person who eats sitting on the floor in the traditional manner, sit with your legs tucked under you, as showing the soles of your feet or shoes is not polite. The left hand is considered unclean: at any Pakistani meal, serve yourself, pass food, and eat with the right hand only.

The most common dishes served here are:

Biryani:

A sophisticated "Mughlai" dish is baked lamb and rice; occasionally made with beef or chicken.

Chapli Kabab:

A spicy minced meat cake; wrapped in nan it makes a good lunch, i.e. a Pakistani hamburger.

Chapati:

Pancake-like wheat bread fried on an iron griddle.

Aloo Kebab:

Minced spiced meat enclosed in mashed potato and fried. Curries may be made with beef, lamb, chicken, shrimp, fish eggs, brains, rutton, mince meat, or vegetables.

Palak Gosht

Spinach and lamb curry

Mulligatawny

A chicken and rice curry soup

Chicken Tandoori

Chicken marinated in yoghurt and spices and roasted in a tandoor, or earthenware bread oven

Chicken Tikka

Marinated grilled chicken.

Chutney

Side dish made with raw, cooked or pickled vegetables or fruits

Dal

Purees of various kinds of lentils

Do Pyaza

Any dish in which onions are a main ingredient

Ghee

Clarified butter used in cooking

Firni

Cream of rice pudding

Halva

Sweet dessert made from milk, usually flavored with carrots or pumpkin

Jalebi

Pretzel shaped sweets in sugar syrup

Khir

Rice Pudding

Kofta:

Ground meatballs with spices

Korma

Curry sauce thickened with yoghurt and nuts or poppy seeds.

Lassi

Cold drink made from yoghurt or buttermilk diluted with water with salt and spices. Very good on sun terrace of R ajaji Restaurant on the Mall in Rawalpindi.

Murgh Musalam

Spiced chicken with almonds and walnuts

Naan

Flat bread baked in a tandoor, or earthenware oven.

Paan

Betel leaf wrapped around silvered betel nuts flavored with lime paste, tobacco and various spices. Used as a digestive and mouth freshner after and between meals

Samosa

A pastry fritter filled with spiced meat or potatoes and fried in deep fat. Found in every bazaar - very good. If you see it fried it is usually safe to eat.

Pacora

Fritter made of almost any vegetable dipped in batter and friend in deep fat. Often found at bazaar stalls.

Palau

Rice cooked with spices, meat, vegetables, lentils or eggs.

Paratha

Fried flat bread, often with a vegetable or meat filling. Made with eggs and butter.

Qahvah

Green tea, usually flavored with cardamon

Rayta

Salad-like combination of raw or cooked vegetables and yoghurt

Roti

Unleavened bread

Shaami Kabab

Minced lamb or beef and dal and spices. Cooked and pulverized and made into browned patties.

Sharbet

Chilled fruit juices

Shawi

Dessert made of fried vermicelli boiled in milk and sugar.

Tikka Kebab

Pieces of meat or chicken marinated in yoghurt and spices and then grilled.

Amroudh

Stewed guava and spices - good cold

Mutton Haleem

Mutton and dal cooked together with spices for a long time.

Roghni Naan

Naan with sesame seeds - very good with haleem.

ASIA AND NEAR EAST REGION

(ANE REGION) 270000001

DATE PREPARED OCTOBER 31, 1980

POSITION DATA										EMPLOYEE DATA																				
POSNO	PG	POSN	P	DS	POSITION TITLE	BS	POSN	POSN	PL	GR	PON	G	L	R	S	M	E	P	NAME	PRIN	EMPLOY	W	E	T	USEA	ARR	ART	DEP		
							AOSC	PL	GR											AOSC	PLAN	GR	S	N	DATE	POST	DATE			
OFFICE OF THE AID REPRESENTATIVE										AFGHAN										273060002										
273060008	03	C	PF	3	AID REPRESENTATIVE	01	034004	FE	00675	UN	0	0	CRANDALL	LARRY	N					034902	FE	00	1	P	0080	0080	0080			
273060008	03	C	PF	1	DEPUTY AID REP	01	034010	FE	00686	UN	0	0	MILLER	JOHN	M					034901	FE	00	1	P	0781	1187	0080			
273060008	03	C	PF		AGRICULTURAL DVL OFF	10	040106	FS	01	00687	UN	0	0	LEWIS	GARY	E				040130	FP	03	1	P	0080	0080	0080			
273060010	03	C	PF		SECRETARY	05	021801	FS	06	00681	UN	0	0	ZANELLA	PATRICIA	ANN				031801	FP	05	1	P	0284	1087	0080			
273060012	03	C	PF		CONTROLLER	04	050502	FS	01	00681	UN	0	0	DEBRUCE	RAYMOND	A				050502	FP	L	01	T	0080	0080	0080			
273060019	03	C	PF		EXECUTIVE OFFICER	03	034101	FS	02	00720	UN	0	0																	
273060018	03	C	PF		PROGRAM OFFICER	02	034501	FS	01	00810	UN	0	0	GIRNING	JOHN	M				034501	FB	01	1	P	0186	0186	0186			
273060017	03	C	PF		SPECIAL PROJECTS OFF	12	030167	FS	02	00726	UN	0	0																	
273060018	04	C	PF		SPECIAL PROJECTS OFF	12	030167	FS	02	00733	UN	0	0	CUSHING	HENRY	B				030167	FB	01	1	P	0387	0387	1080			
273060019	03	C	PF		PROGRAM OFFICER	02	034501	FS	02	00685	UN	0	0	WOLTERS	CURT	C	F			011007	FB	03	1	P	0827	1288	0380			
273060020	03	C	PF		AGRICULTURAL DVL OFF	10	040106	FS	02	00717	UN	0	0	CHURCH	PHILLIP	E				011026	FB	02	1	P	0580	0580	0580			
273060021	03	C	PF		PROJECT DVL OFF	04	034511	FS	01	00718	UN	0	0	SWAIN	DIANA	L				034501	FB	03	1	P	0580	0580	0580			
273060022	03	C	PF	1	SUP GENERAL DVL OFF	12	030161	FS	01	00722	UN	0	0	EICHMY	THOMAS	M				030161	FB	03	1	P	0778	0888	1080			
273060023	03	B	TF		SPECIAL PROJECTS OFF	12	030167	FS	01	00716	UN	0	0	OAKLEY	PHYLLIS	ELLIOTT				030167	FB	01	1	N	0388	0388	0380			
273060024	03	C	PF		HEALTH DVL OFF	50	062506	FS	01	00718	UN	0	0	PALMER	DOUGLAS	M				062506	FP	02	1	P	0078	0078	0080			
273060026	03	C	PF		SUP SPC PROJECTS OFF	12	030168	FS	01	00721	UN	0	0	MAHAM	VAL	R				030167	FB	02	1	P	0186	0186	0080			
273060027	03	C	PF		CONTRACT OFF	53	110209	FS	02	00684	UN	0	0	MAY	JOHN	A				110209	FP	L	03	1	P	0288	0288	0280		

(VACANT) *Held until 1/90*

(VACANT)

Ali, Basarat
 (CANDIDATE SELECTED)

ETA 10/90

STAFFING PATTERN

ASIA AND NEAR EAST REGION

(ANE REGION) 270000001

DATE PREPARED OCTOBER 31, 1960

POSITION DATA										EMPLOYEE DATA																			
TYPE U DN		POSITION TITLE	POSH		POSH		L R S		NAME	PRIN		EMPLOY		Y E		WASH		AWR		DEP									
POSH	PO		POSH	P	DO	BS	ADSC	PL		GR	PON	G	Q	K	ADSC	PLAN	GR	S	N		DATE	POST	DAY						
273080030	03	C	PP			SECRETARY	05	031801	FS	08	00680	UR	0	0	<i>Cross, Mary - ETN 10/90</i> WILSON HARRIET (CANDIDATE SELECTED) 031801 PP R 08 1 T 0287 0287 128 (VACANT) <i>Dochter, Phila</i>														
273080035	04	B	TF			SECRETARY	05	031801	FS	08	00682	UR	0	0															
273080040	03	C	PP			SECRETARY	05	031801	FS	08	00724	UR	0	0															

TOTAL		STAT		POSITION		DATA		PART		INTR		TOTAL		STAT		EMPLOYEE		DATA		OTHER		DETL		PTEPP		PTEPP	
POSH	C	STAT	D	PERM	TEMP	FULL	TIME	TIME	TIME	TIME	TIME	TIME	EMPL	C	D	FULL	PART	INTR	LNOP	OTHR	HIRE	IN	LIMIT	EMPL	EMPL	EMPL	EMPL
20	18	2	18	2	18	1	0	17	15	2	17	0	17	15	2	17	0	0	0	0	16	16	0	15	0	15	